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ABSTRACT 
Robustness of data in this thesis is taken to mean reliable 
storage of data and also high availability of data .objects in spite 
of the occurrence of faults. Algorithms and data structures which 
can be used to provide such robustness in the presence of various 
disk, processor and communication network failures are described. 
Reliable storage of data at individual nodes in a network of 
computer systems is based on the use of a stable storage mechanism 
combined with strategies which are used to help ensure crash resis-
tance of file operations in spite of the use of buffering mechan-
isms by operating systems. High availability of data in the net-
work is maintained by replicating data on different computers and 
mutual consistency between replicas is ensured in spite of network 
parti tioning. 
A stable storage system which provides atomicity for more com-
plex data structures instead of the usual fixed size page has been 
designed and implemented and its performance evaluated. A crash 
resistant file system has also been implemented and evaluated. 
Many of the techniques presented here are used in the design 
of what we call CRES (Crash-resistant, Replicated and Stable) 
storage. CRES storage provides fault tolerance facilities for 
various disk and processor faults. It also provides fault tolerance 
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facilities for network partitioning through the provision of an 
algorithm for the update and merge of a partitioned data storage 
system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
As more and more computers are used in the automation of 
various essential services, the reliability of computer systems 
has become increasingly important. Most of the results of the 
processing which is carried out by computer systems are stored 
in some form of storage medium. Many computer programs get 
their input data from such media. A fault in any part of a 
computer system could easily be manifested as an error in the 
stored data at some point in the computation process. (We will 
rely on the intuitive meaning of faults, errors and failures in 
this introductory part of the thesis. A definition of these 
concepts which conforms to normal computer usage is given in 
the next chapter.) 
Since programs often share data, an error in a single data 
item can be propagated throughout a computer system. Correct 
programs using such erroneous data could produce erroneous 
results. Users of computer systems expect that the data which 
is stored by such systems will be reliably stored. By this we 
mean that users who have entrusted their data to a computer 
system expect to be able to get that data when they want it. 
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Moreover, they also expect to get exactly the same data which 
they entrusted to the computer system and not a mutilated ver-
sion of that data. Where such assurances cannot be given, users 
lose confidence in the computer system and could prefer to 
store their data in a more primitive but reliable and trusted 
medium. Hoare[Hoare75] described an error in a data bank to be 
potentially as catastrophic as an error in an ordinary bank 
which keeps money for its clients. The reliability of computer 
systems clearly depends heavily on the reliability of the data 
which are stored by these systems. 
There are two complementary approaches to the provision of 
reliable computer systems. Avizienis[Avizienis75] calls these 
two approaches fault-tolerance and fault-intolerance. The 
fault intolerant approach aims at avoiding faults, and tries to 
eliminate all sources of unreliability from a computer system. 
It requires that efforts be spent in perfecting a computer sys-
tem (hardware and software) before such a system is put into 
use. Hardware systems based on this approach use the most 
expensive high quality circuits in the construction of comput-
ers. There is no guarantee, however, that these circuits will 
never fail. 
Software systems which use the fault intolerant approach 
aim at exhaustive testing of software modules so as to elim-
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inate all errors. Program verification methods can also be used 
with the aim of proving programs correct. A program which has 
been proven correct is expected to behave always as specified. 
There has been reasonable progress in the area of program 
verification and correctness proofs. However, proofs can be 
faulty and even rigorously proven programs are executed on 
hardware systems which have not been proven correct. It is 
therefore difficult to ensure that such programs will always 
produce correct results. Likewise, extensive testing of 
software modules cannot guarantee the absence of errors except 
in very special situations. Fault intolerant approaches may 
therefore not be sufficient for the provision of highly reli-
able computer systems. There is the need to consider fault 
tolerant approaches as a complementary, rather than an alterna-
tive, method for providing high reliability. 
Fault tolerance is based on the use of redundancy. Such 
redundancy is used to detect the causes of unreliability in 
computer systems and to counteract their adverse effects. The 
causes of unreliability are expected to be present but reliable 
computing is achieved in spite of their existence. Redundancy 
in fault tolerant systems can be classified as (1) masking 
redundancy and (2) dynamic redundancy. In masking redundancy, 
redundant components are incorporated into a system in such a 
way that the effects of component faults are not visible to the 
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environment of the component. Dynamic redundancy on the other 
hand is used for detecting the existence of errors in a system 
so that an appropriate form of error recovery can be invoked. 
The combined use of masking and dynamic redundancy enables the 
detection of errors in computer systems and the provision of 
continued service in the presence of faults. 
1.2. AIM OF THESIS 
This thesis is concerned with the provision of fault 
tolerance facilities in a decentralised computer system. It 
considers the problem of providing reliable storage of data in 
distributed environments so that the integrity of data is main-
tained and there is high availability of stored data. Specifi-
cally, it considers the problem of providing disk storage 
facilities that can tolerate various types of disk and proces-
sor faults and using these facilities as the basis for con-
structing highly reliable file systems. Our data storage sys-
tem is designed to be used by a set of computers connected by a 
communications network. This thesis therefore also considers 
the problem of ensuring that the availability of files in the 
network is high in spite of various node and network failures. 
Our emphasis is on how to make file systems reliable as 
opposed to the design of file systems per se. This is because 
there are many file systems already in existence and the design 
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of such systems is much better understood than the problem of 
making these systems reliable. 
There are now many distributed systems in which user data 
is accessible throughout a network irrespective of location. 
Examples of such systems are UNIX 
INGRES[Stonebraker76], XDFS[Sturgis80] 
United[Brownbridge82], 
and SDD-l[Rothnie80]. 
Our experiments were carried out in a UNIX United distributed 
system. A UNIX United system joins together several individual 
UNIX systems so as to give the illusion of a single UNIX sys-
tem. Users in any UNIX system within the UNIX United framework 
can access data in the other UNIX systems as though the remote 
data were part of the user's own local system. An overview of 
the UNIX United system and its naming scheme is given in 
chapter 3. 
Node and network failures have been recognised as major 
impediments to the provision of reliable storage in distributed 
systems. In addition, transient hardware faults and decay 
phenomena of disk storage devices could affect the integrity of 
stored data. Various solutions to some of these problems have 
been proposed. In chapter 2 we shall discuss some of the pro-
posed solutions. 
A mechanism known as stable storage [Lampson79] has been 
advocated as a useful paradigm for the construction of reliable 
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data storage systems. This thesis investigates the use of the 
stable storage mechanism and its associated crash recovery 
facilities to help ensure that the probability of losing data 
which is stored on disk storage devices is negligible. 
The provision of such a facility would be sufficient for 
the construction of a reliable data storage system if there 
were no need to provide reliable management of stable objects 
created by a stable storage system, and if such objects were 
always available. These problems lead us to extend the concept 
of stable storage to what we call CRES (Crash-resistant, Repli-
cated and Stable) storage. CRES storage addresses the problem 
of maintaining the consistency of data as well as the manage-
ment and availability of data objects. The next section sum-
marises our approach to the construction of CRES storage. 
1.3. SUMMARY OF APPROACH 
Our approach to reliable data storage construction 
proceeds in three stages. Figure 1 shows the relationship 
between these three stages. 
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CRES Storage 
(Crash-resistant, Replicated and Stable Storage) 
1 
-------------------------1------------------------------
Crash-resistant Crash-resistant Crash-resistant 
File System File System File System 
(on computer 1) (on computer 2) (on computer 3) 
1 1 1 
--------1----------------1-----------------1------------
Stable Disk Stable Disk Stable Disk 
(on computer 1) (on computer 2) (on computer 3) 
1 1 1 
--------1----------------1-----------------1------------
/ \ / \ / \ 
/ \ / \ / \ 
Physical 
Disk 
Physical 
Disk 
Physical Physical 
Disk Disk 
Physical Physical 
Disk Disk 
Figure 1: Levels of Abstraction for CRES Storage 
The first stage, which is described in chapter 3, provides 
virtual disks (called stable disks) that are much more reliable 
than their real counterparts. The abstraction of stable disks 
is used to maintain the consistency of data which is stored on 
disk storage devices in spite of transient I/O faults, decay of 
the storage medium and some effects of processor crashes. A 
novel algorithm for supporting more complex data structures 
instead of ordinary pages in stable storage design is proposed. 
This algorithm provides atomic objects of variable length 
instead of the usual fixed size pages. A stable storage system 
utilising this algorithm has been implemented and its perfor-
mance characteristics evaluated. 
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The consistency of a stable storage system does not 
guarantee the consistency of a file system which uses it 
because of some faults that can arise from certain file manage-
ment activities. The second stage of our experiment, which is 
described in chapter 4, is thus concerned with the reliable 
management of data stored on stable disks. This stage imple-
ments a crash resistant file system by ensuring that the use of 
data management facilities (such as buffering mechanisms 
employed by file systems) do not result in data inconsistency 
when a processor crash occurs. A crash resistant UNIX file sys-
tem which is based on the abstraction of stable storage has 
been implemented by making modifications to the UNIX kernel. 
An evaluation of the performance of this implementation has 
also been carried out. 
A reliable data storage system should ensure that data 
items are accessible in spite of node and network failures. 
The third stage of this work, which is the subject of chapter 
5, replicates the reliable files which are implemented by the 
second stage on different computers so as to increase the avai-
lability of these files. The use of data replication requires 
that the mutual consistency of replicas be maintained. Network 
partitioning resulting from the failure of the communication 
network could interfere with the preservation of such con-
sistency. We present an algorithm for the update and merge of a 
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partitioned data storage system which differs from work done by 
others in this area. Algorithms which provide a merge of par-
titioned networks require that either the semantics of all 
operations on data are known or that application programs 
declare their readset and writeset in advance. (The readset 
and writeset of an application program are those data items 
which the program reads from or writes to.) Other algorithms 
depend on the ability to obtain a global serialisable schedule 
of the combined set of transactions from all partitions in a 
network[Wright83]. In contrast, our algorithm dynamically 
determines the readset and writeset of each partition, so that 
conflicting update operations can be detected. Its merge proto-
col enables resolution of conflicts before an actual merge 
operation is carried out. 
Before we proceed with the discussion of reliable data 
storage construction, we survey in chapter 2 the various faults 
which affect the consistency of data and measures and mechan-
isms for maintaining data consistency in distributed systems. 
The three stages in our data storage construction will be 
presented in chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively. Chapter 6 sug-
gests areas for future study and presents some concluding 
remarks. 
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2. DATA CONSISTENCY IN DISTRIBUTIID SYSTEMS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Systems which store data usually have a set of constraints 
which must be maintained. Data stored by such systems are con-
sidered to be consistent if the set of predicates which 
prescribe the systems constraints are satisfied. In order to 
discuss data consistency therefore, it is important to examine 
the faults which could violate these constraints. 
Our concepts of faults, errors and failures are based on 
the definitions by Randell[RandeI178] and Anderson[Anderson81]. 
We consider a system to be a set of interacting components 
which is designed to provide a specified service. In providing 
this service, a system makes state transitions from an initial 
state to a final state. A sequence of state transitions which 
takes a system from an initial state to a final state so as to 
provide the specified service will be referred to as a correct 
sequence of transitions. 
A failure occurs when a system does not provide its speci-
fied service. A system is said to contain an error when it 
makes an incorrect state transition such that subsequent state 
transitions cannot lead to the provision of the specified 
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service. A fault is the underlying cause of an error. 
We follow the model of errors in[Lampson79] and classify 
errors as either expected or unexpected. A system is in a nor-
mal state if it contains no errors otherwise it is in an 
erroneous state. 
System 
I \ 
I \ 
Normal 
State 
Erroneous 
State 
I \ 
I \ 
Expected Unexpected 
Errors errors 
Figure 2: System State Classifications 
Figure 2 gives a pictorial representation of system states 
based on this classification of errors. We consider a fault 
which affects data to be any event which makes stored data 
irretrievable or which alters the contents of stored data to a 
state which is different from that specified by the user as 
stated in the system constraints. 
Recovery of data objects aims at restoring data in a sys-
tern to a usable state by eliminating errors. Concurrency con-
trol mechanisms are used to ensure that interference between 
user update operations do not result in data inconsistency. 
Discussion of recovery techniques can be found in [Verhofs-
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tad78], [Gray81], [Kohler81], [Haerder83]. In [Bernstein81] 
Bernstein presents a survey of concurrency control schemes. 
This chapter surveys the general area of data consistency, of 
which recovery and concurrency control form a part. It examines 
data consistency with respect to 
(1) Consistency in the presence of concurrent access 
to shared data. 
(2) Consistency in the presence of component faults 
(3) Mutual consistency between replicated resources. 
This method of survey has the advantage of giving a uni-
fied approach to concurrency, recovery and replication issues 
with respect to their roles in the maintenance of data con-
sistency. 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. The next 
section introduces distributed systems concepts and problems. 
Section 2.3 discusses the causes of inconsistency in stored 
data. In section 2.4 measures which are used to maintain the 
consistency of data in spite of faults are discussed. Section 
2.5 presents some concluding remarks. 
2.2. DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 
The subject of distributed computing systems is relatively 
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new and there are several definitions of such systems. We con-
sider a computing system to be distributed if it consists of a 
collection of computers (loosely or tightly synchronised) which 
communicate by means of a communication network and in which 
there is no shared memory among individual computers. Some of 
the problems which arise in distributed systems are due to the 
physical separation of the components and the possibility of 
heterogeneity among such components. Some of these problems are 
concerned with providing a uniform naming scheme for objects, 
implementing an interprocessor communications scheme, syn-
chronising the activities of the various computers and provid-
ing a mechanism to handle new sources of errors which might 
arise due to the distribution of processes and data. For ease 
of discussion we shall consider data items in a distributed 
system to be grouped into objects, and activities which manipu-
late data will be referred to as tasks. 
2.3. CAUSES OF DATA INCONSISTENCY 
This section discusses the major causes of inconsistency 
in stored data, namely update interference, component faults 
and causes of mutual inconsistency between replicated data. 
2.3.1. update Interference 
Interference between concurrent update operations is a 
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fault arising from interaction between tasks in a computer sys-
tem. If tasks are correctly carried out separately one at a 
time, then in the absence of faults, the output produced by 
each task will be consistent with the user's specification. 
However, if several tasks are performed concurrently and make 
use of common resources there is the possibility that the 
activities of various tasks on shared data could interfere in 
such a way that outputs are produced which do not conform to 
specification. Concurrency control schemes such as those 
presented in [Bernstein8l], [Rosenkrantz78] are used to prevent 
such interference between tasks. Bernstein and Goodman [Bern-
stein8l] illustrated the concurrency control problem by giving 
examples of anomalies which could arise in on-line electronic 
fund transfer systems. In such systems, a customer is allowed 
to read data, perform some computations and then write the 
results in the data storage system. The lost update problem 
and the retrieval of intermediate data are examples of problems 
which could arise in these systems. 
Example 1: The Lost Update 
Suppose that two customers A and B are accessing a bank 
account X at the same time. Suppose that account X contains one 
thousand dollars (SlOOO). Let A and B execute the following 
algorithms: 
- 15 -
A'S Algorithm 
Read X into XAi 
1* X = 1000*/ 
Add 10 to XAi 
/* X = 1000*1 
Write XA into Xi 
1* X = 1010*1 
B'S Algorithm 
Read X into XBi 
/* X = 1000*/ 
Add 100 to XB i 
/* X = 1000*/ 
Write XB into Xi 
/* X = 1100*/ 
Figure 3: The Lost Update 
Let us assume that the instructions on the same line are 
carried out in parallel. Since A and B have deposited $10 and 
$100 respectively into account X, the expected final value of X 
should be $1110 which would reflect both update operations. 
From figure 3, it can be seen that only one update operation 
will actually be reflected (either A's or B's update opera-
tion). The other operation is lost. Concurrency control mechan-
isms are used to ensure that such user interference do not 
result in a data storage system having a state which is incon-
sistent with the user specification. 
Example 2: Retrieval of Intermediate Data 
A problem can also arise when data which is in an inter-
mediate state is retrieved by a user. Suppose that a customer 
maintains two accounts, a deposit account 5 and a current 
account Y which contain $1000 and $200 respectively. If a user 
A is transferring $100 from the deposit to the current account 
while a user B is printing the total balance in the bank 
- 16 -
account (the sum of the amounts in the deposit and current 
accounts), the algorithm executed by A and B could be the fol-
lowing: 
A's Algorithm 
Read 5 into SA; 
/* 5 = 1000*1 
Subtract 100 from SA; 
/* 5 = 1000*1 
Write SA into 5; 
/* 5 = 900*1 
Read Y into YA; 
/* Y = 200*1 
Add 100 to YA; 
1* Y = 200*1 
Write YA into Y; 
1* Y = 300*1 
B'S Algorithm 
Read 5 into SBi 
1* 5 = 900*1 
Read Y into YBi 
1* Y = 200*1 
Print sum of SB and YBi 
1* sum = 1100*/ 
Figure 4: Intermediate Data Retrieval 
Let us again assume that instructions on the same line are 
carried out in parallel. From figure 4 it can be seen that 
user B read the contents of the bank account while A's fund 
transfer was still in progress and before it was completed. 
User B therefore retrieved an erroneous version of the contents 
of the account even though the final value placed into the bank 
account by A was correct. 
There are many circumstances in which interference between 
user update operations could occur. The examples given here 
simply illustrate two of the many situations which could arise. 
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User interference due to concurrent update operations could 
leave stored data in an inconsistent state or give an incorrect 
view of data to the user. The use of proper concurrency control 
mechanisms help eliminate such anomalies. 
2.3.2. Component Faults 
We consider a distributed system to consist of five basic 
components namely storage, processors, communication, software 
and users. This section discusses faults which affect these 
components and how component faults affect stored data. 
Storage Faults 
By storage, we mean secondary storage such as disk storage 
devices. (Volatile storage will be considered to be part of a 
processor.) Typical commands to a disk storage device would be 
to (1) read data from disk and (2) write data onto disk. There 
are also the issues of addressing and locating data on disk 
storage devices. 
Unfortunately, it is not always possible for operations on 
disk storage devices to succeed. The physical storage medium 
could decay, making retrieval of data impossible. A disk could 
suffer a head crash caused by mechanical or electromagnetic 
faults in a disk arm or drive, thereby destroying user data. 
Transient errors caused by electromagnetic fluctuation could 
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temporarily alter the state of stored data. These faults make 
disk storage insufficiently reliable for storing critical data. 
A mechanism which provides tolerance for storage faults is dis-
cussed in chapter 3. 
Processor Faults 
Faults in a processor lead to processor failures. A pro-
cessor may fail in two ways. The first is often referred to as 
a processor crash. When a processor crash occurs, the processor 
stops processing and the contents of volatile storage are lost. 
The loss of information in volatile storage could lead to 
inconsistency in long term data which is stored on disk storage 
devices. Consider our electronic fund transfer example of fig-
ure 4. In A's algorithm, a processor crash could occur after 
the "write SA into S" instruction and before the "write YA into 
Y' instruction is executed. The system could attempt to 
naively recover from the processor crash without ever executing 
the rest of the bank transfer statements. The value of the bank 
account which is stored on disk would then be erroneous. 
The other mode of processor failure is often regarded as 
malicious failure of a processor. In this case, the processor 
does not stop but continues operation although its behaviour is 
unpredictable and could be malicious in the sense that faulty 
components within the processor continue to provide unspecified 
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service. Such malicious behaviour could destroy stored data by 
writing invalid data to storage or overwriting already stored 
data. NMR schemes such as the triple-modular redundancy 
scheme[Lyons62] can be used to mask such malicious hardware 
failures. This approach involves the use of several replicated 
hardware modules and voting on their results so that the major-
ity result can be chosen. Schneider [Schneider83] also 
describes an abstraction called "fail-stop" processor which 
provides tolerance for such processor failures. 
Communication Faults 
The communication subsystem delivers messages between 
users. There are two standard operations on messages namely, 
"send" and "receive". Figure 5 shows the various possible out-
comes when messages are sent. 
Message Sent 
1 
1---------------------------1 
Delivered Not Delivered 
1 1 
1------------1 1--------------1 
Correctly Incorrectly Lost Undeliverable 
1 
1 
1-----------1 
1 1 
Corrupted Duplicated 
1 
1 
1----------1--------1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
Network Receiver 
Partitioned Crashed 
Message 
Refused 
Figure 5: Possible Outcomes for Messages 
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The effect on stored data of incorrectly delivered mes-
sages or undelivered messages is that either bad data is writ-
ten into storage or data which is expected to be written into 
storage is not written. Unless such faults are detected, stored 
data will be left in an inconsistent state. Remote procedure 
call mechanisms and similar protocols are used to ensure that 
messages are properly delivered. Algorithms for error detection 
and message retransmission schemes are also used to tolerate 
some adverse effects of communication failures. The failure of 
the communications network, followed by continued processing in 
multiple partitions makes it difficult to maintain the mutual 
consistency of replicated copies of resources in a distributed 
system. Communication failure also prevents the completion of 
distributed tasks by making it impossible for the various parts 
of a distributed task running on different machines to be prop-
erly synchronised. Algorithms for handling network partitioning 
address these issues. 
Software Faults 
Software constitutes a major proportion of the complexity 
in computer systems. Thus although it is usually assumed 
(rightly or wrongly) that the hardware is correctly designed it 
is extremely difficult to guarantee that a complex software 
system does not contain design faults. Such a guarantee 
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requires the ability to enumerate all possible failures modes 
(if any) of the software modules and all possible interactions 
of such modules. This is very difficult even for a reasonably 
small software subsystem. In the presence of software faults, 
the behaviour of a computing system is unpredictable and data 
can be damaged. Fault tolerance for unexpected software faults 
is difficult to provide. The problem, as Randell[RandelI78] 
pOinted out, is "how to tolerate faults which are unanticipated 
and unanticipatable". Two approaches, namely the recovery block 
scheme and N-version programming, have been developed for pro-
viding tolerance for such faults. These schemes will be dis-
cussed later. 
User Faults 
It can be said that human beings constitute the most 
unpredictable component of a computer system. However, the user 
faults which we are concerned with are those related to the 
submission of wrong input data and operator faults (such as 
mounting the wrong tape on a tape drive). When wrong data is 
not detected, a computer system makes correct state transitions 
but produces outputs which are not consistent with the system 
specification. This is because the system started in an errone-
ous initial state. 
Error detection mechanisms can sometimes detect invalid 
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data at the interface between two interacting components. This 
is often referred to as interface checking. There is no guaran-
tee that wrong input data can always be detected by such 
checks. Propagation of such data could result in wrong data 
being written into a data storage system and thereby lead to 
overall system failure. By this we mean that the system of 
which the computer and the user are components, fails. 
2.3.3. Unsynchronised Update of Replicated Data 
Technological advances in communication network deSign 
have led to the development of operating systems in which user 
data is distributed around a network. In such systems, it is 
not unusual for a user in one machine to access data on other 
machines in the network or to have a task distributed among 
several machines. However data required by a user may not be 
accessible due to a network failure. To cope with this prob-
lem, many systems replicate data on different machines, so that 
if the machine which stores the original copy of user data is 
not available due to node or network failure, any accessible 
replica can be used instead. 
However, the replication of data could result in mutual 
inconsistency between replicated objects. It is necessary that 
the mutual consistency of replicas be maintained. Some algo-
rithms designed for this purpose are described in [Ellis77], 
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[Mullery75], [Thomas78]. However, maintaining such consistency 
in the presence of network failures is difficult due to the 
inability to synchronise the autonomous update operations on 
replicated objects in non-communicating sites. Mutual incon-
sistency between replicas could result in users obtaining a 
view of data which is not consistent with the system specifica-
tion. 
2.4. MEASURES FOR MAINTAINING DATA CONSISTENCY 
This section discusses some software fault tolerance meas-
ures and techniques which are used to maintain the conSistency 
of data in spite of the sources of unreliability which have 
been discussed in the previous sections. Measures and mechan-
isms which are used to maintain data conSistency in the pres-
ence of (1) Concurrent accesses to shared data, (2) Component 
Faults, and (3) Replicated Data will be discussed. 
2.4.1. Shared Data Access Control 
One of the techniques used in maintaining the consistency 
of data is the control of access to shared data. Many algo-
rithms exist for synchronising accesses to such data so as to 
avoid interference between user updates. Most of these algo-
rithms have been proposed as concurrency control schemes [Bern-
stein81], [Rosenkrantz78], [Papadimitiou84], [Bhargava82]. 
- 24 -
Concurrency control is concerned with ensuring that poten-
tially interfering user accesses do not leave stored data in an 
inconsistent state. Bhargava[Bhargava82] outlined the three 
basic approaches to the design of concurrency control algo-
rithms as: 
(1) The use of the "wait" synchronization technique. This 
requires that a task needing to access a resource has first to 
acquire it exclusively. All other tasks which need the resource 
wait until the resource is released. One approach to implement-
ing a "wait" synchronization method is to implement a locking 
scheme [Eswaran76], [Schlageter76], [Stonebraker79]. A lock-
ing scheme locks any resource in use by a task and releases it 
when it is no longer needed by the task. There are various dif-
ferent locking strategies, one of the best known being two-
phase locking (2PL). The major disadvantages of locking stra-
tegies are the bottlenecks created by tasks waiting for 
resources and the reduction in concurrency resulting from the 
use of such schemes. 
(2) The use of timestamps, circulating tokens and tickets 
[LeLann78], [Bernstein80] are approaches which can be mapped 
onto locking strategies. These approaches order the activities 
of a system by allowing only the task which has the highest (or 
lowest) timestamp, or which is in possession of the ticket or 
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token, to access shared resources. These schemes differ from 
locking strategies in their method of ordering activities. 
(3) The use of backout strategies is often referred to as 
the optimistic approach to concurrency control[Kung82]. Tasks 
are allowed to proceed 
shared data despite 
freely with 
the risk of 
respect 
errors 
to accesses to 
being introduced. 
Before update operations are committed, conflicts are detected 
and resolved. In resolving conflicts, recovery strategies such 
as those which are discussed in the next section are used. The 
operations of some tasks may have to be undone in this resolu-
tion process. 
2.4.2. Software Approaches for Tolerating Component Faults 
This section discusses some software approaches for 
tolerating component faults. It does not deal with each com-
ponent fault individually but instead discusses general stra-
tegies and mechanisms which can be used to tolerate such 
faults. Recovery from errors constitutes the major approach to 
the maintenance of the consistency of data. Different stra-
tegies are used depending on whether faults are anticipated or 
unanticipated. 
2.4.2.1. Fault Tolerance Strategies 
Forward and backward error recovery schemes constitute the 
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two main software fault tolerance approaches for tolerating 
anticipated and unanticipated faults, respectively. 
Forward Error Recovery 
Fault tolerance for anticipated software faults is gen-
erally provided by the use of forward error recovery tech-
niques, such as exception handling schemes [Goodenough75], 
[Cristian82]. These schemes aim at detecting and correcting 
errors before these errors can cause extensive damage to data. 
They provide efficient and specialised recovery facilities. 
Such scheme are not deSigned to work when unexpected faults 
occur. 
Reliability in software systems requires that programs 
give a well-defined response to all requests for service. 
Detecting and coping with unusual conditions (even though 
expected) makes programs complicated and unreadable. An excep-
tion handling mechanism provides a linguistic facility which 
permits a more organised method of detecting and coping with 
errors. Let us refer to the processing which should be carried 
out when an expected error (such as overflow in an arithmetic 
computation) occurs as abnormal processing. Exception handling 
mechanisms provide a clear separation between the normal and 
abnormal processing performed by a software component, thereby 
making the system Simpler, more readable and therefore more 
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reliable. A number of recent systems (such as [Liskov79], 
[DefenceSO], [LiskovS3]) incorporate exception handling facil-
ities. 
Backward Error Recovery 
Fault tolerance for unanticipated software faults usually 
aims at restoring a faulty system to an earlier state which is 
presumed to be "error-free". It does not aim at detecting 
specific errors, since it does not know what faults to expect 
and hence what errors might have been generated. It only needs 
to know that something has gone wrong. 
One of the ways of coping with such faults is the use of 
backward error recovery schemes. This approach requires that 
state information (recovery data) be saved periodically. In the 
event of an error, a system is restored to a previous error-
free state and restarted from that state in the hope that the 
state preceded the occurrence of the fault. A thorough survey 
of recovery techniques which are based on the use of state res-
toration has been carried out by Verhofstad [Verhofstad7S]. 
2.4.2.2. Fault Tolerance Mechanisms 
This section discusses some of the mechanisms which are 
used in software systems for fault tolerance purposes. 
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Recovery Block Scheme 
The recovery block scheme [Horning74], [RandeI175] pro-
vides a means of error detection and recovery for unanticipated 
software errors. It uses redundant software modules such that 
when one module fails, control is passed to an "alternate". 
Errors are detected by the use of an acceptance test which 
tests the outputs produced by a module with respect to the sys-
tem specification. In the event of an error, a system is 
restored to a previous "error-free" state (recovery point) 
before control is passed to an alternate module. The modules in 
a recovery block scheme should ideally not be "fault related". 
By this we mean that such modules are expected to be indepen-
dently developed so as to minimise the risk of common faults. 
This scheme provides an effective means of handling unantici-
pated software errors and for providing continued service in 
the presence of such errors. 
H-Version Programming 
Another mechanism which can be used to tolerate unantici-
pated faults in software systems is the use of N-Version 
programming[Avizienis77]. In this scheme, H different versions 
of a program are executed at the same time. Their results are 
compared and the result which is submitted by the majority of 
the versions is chosen. This scheme can tolerate any 
- 29 -
unanticipated fault which does not violate the N-Version con-
trol structure. However, if the majority of the program ver-
sions are in error, the erroneous result will be chosen. 
Atomic Transactions 
I Gray[Gray81~ .•. ] defines a transaction as a set of Read 
and Write commands with the following properties: 
(i) Consistency: Transactions only make correct state 
transitions. 
(ii) Atomicity: Either all of a transaction's commands 
are carried out or none is. 
(iii) Durability: The effects of a completed transaction 
cannot be abrogated. 
Transactions can be used as units of consistency and 
recovery. The atomic property of transactions is used to keep 
stored data consistent. Maintenance of data conSistency by 
transactions is based on the use of backward error recovery. A 
transaction aims at carrying out all update operations or none 
of them. It therefore provides UNDO capabilities so as to elim-
inate the effects of partially completed operations. Transac-
tion mechanisms are typically provided for database systems, 
but the concept can apply to any form of data storage system. 
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A transaction transforms an already consistent database to 
a consistent database since the effects of uncompleted opera-
tions are undone. One of the limitations of the transaction 
scheme is that a considerable amount of work might have to be 
undone if the transaction cannot be completed. This is partic-
ularly undesirable in long-lived transactions where days or 
possibly months of work might be undone. 
Transactions and other schemes which use backward error 
recovery can be combined with forward error recovery schemes so 
as to provide a highly reliable and consistent computer system. 
The use of forward error recovery helps minimise the probabil-
ity of system failures by providing fault tolerance for 
specific faults. This in turn reduces the frequency of "UNOO" 
operations required in a system. 
The construction of a stable storage system is an example 
of the use of forward error recovery and a limited form of 
backward error recovery to provide a disk storage system which 
is resilient to (it is hoped) all faults affecting disk 
storage. It specifically tolerates anticipated disk faults and 
provides a crash recovery routine which restores a disk storage 
system to a consistent state after a processor crash. The use 
of such a crash recovery routine can be regarded as the use of 
a limited form of backward error recovery. The design and 
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implementation of a stable storage system will be discussed in 
detail in chapter 3. 
2.4.3. Maintaining Mutual ConSistency of Replicas 
The last two sections discussed measures and mechanisms 
for maintaining the consistency of data in the presence of con-
current access to shared data and component faults. This sec-
tion considers the use of mutual consistency algorithms to 
maintain the consistency of stored data. Mutual consistency 
algorithms aim at providing tolerance for faults which arise 
due to the use of data replication. Algorithms for detecting 
mutual inconSistency among replicas in the presence of network 
partitioning are described in [Parker83], [Brereton83]. These 
papers discuss resolution of inconsistency only for simple 
files whose operation semantics are known, such as directories 
and mail-boxes. Assuming that inconsistencies have been 
detected, Wright[Wright83] presents an algorithm for merging a 
partitioned database for the general object type. However this 
algorithm requires that the readset and writeset of an applica-
tion be known beforehand so that the activities of an applica-
tion can be grouped into transaction classes. It could be dif-
ficult to use such a scheme for applications which do not know 
a priori all their resource requirements. A more detailed dis-
cussion of these issues is given in chapter 5. That chapter 
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also presents an algorithm which handles the detection and 
resolution of inconsistencies among replicates in a partitioned 
data storage system. 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the major causes of data incon-
sistency in distributed systems and summarised the approaches 
which are used to maintain consistency in the presence of 
faults. It classified methods for maintaining the consistency 
of data as consisting of three basic approaches, namely, 
methods for maintaining consistency in the presence of 
(i) Concurrent accesses to shared data 
(ii) Faults and errors 
(iii) Replicated resources. 
It discussed various strategies, abstractions and mechanisms 
which are used to keep stored data consistent. 
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3. A RELIABLE STABLE STORAGE SYSTEM FOR UNIX 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the first of the three stages in 
our data storage construction. It describes the implementation 
of a stable storage system which converts several fallible disk 
stores into a reliable device for storing data. It provides 
reliable reading and writing of data in a UNIX environment in 
spite of various types of hardware faults. The implementation 
makes available to UNIX users a convenient way of uSing the 
facilities of a stable storage system by providing the abstrac-
tion of stable files and by maintaining the standard UNIX sys-
tem call interface. Internally the implementation systemati-
cally handles abnormal situations by separating normal and 
exceptional processing in both the system description and 
implementation. This is achieved through the use of a fault 
tolerance design notation for the description of the system and 
the implementation of that notation using an exception handling 
package. 
The problem of tolerating faults in a distributed system 
is made more difficult by individual site crashes which may 
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leave information stored locally in each processor, or globally 
within the distributed system, in an inconsistent state. 
Unreliable disk storage devices, which can suffer from physical 
decays, also threaten the reliability of stored data. The use 
of a so-called stable storage system [Lampson79] is now 
accepted as one of the ways of maintaining the internal con-
sistency of data which is stored on disk storage devices in the 
presence of hardware failures. Such a system makes use of 
replicated physical hardware and carefully designed fault 
tolerance strategies in order to provide an abstract store for 
which the probability of failure can be regarded as negligible. 
Our implementation uses the stable storage mechanism to provide 
a reliable repository for data which tolerates disk faults 
through the provision of stable disks. It also provides crash 
recovery facilities for the data which is stored on such disks. 
Stable disks have the same actions as ordinary disk storage but 
with the property that, to a very high degree of probability, 
no anticipated adverse events occur. As yet, there has been 
only limited experience with the implementation, use and 
evaluation of stable storage systems. Our implementation is 
partially an exercise in that direction. The implementation 
described here provides a simple way of providing the facili-
ties of a stable storage system as an independent facility 
(which is not embedded in an operating system) by implementing 
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such a system as a collection of user processes. (An alterna-
tive approach is described in section 3.7.) The implementation 
which is described here addresses the problems of providing 
fault tolerance facilities in response to: 
(i) processor crashes 
(ii) random decays of phYSical storage devices, and 
(iii) transient input/output faults 
It tolerates disk crashes by the use of two disks which are not 
"fault-related" 
the other. This 
in such a way that each acts as a backup for 
implementation differs from other stable 
storage systems in its provision of the abstraction of UNIX-
like stable files rather than simple disk storage areas and in 
the way its internal design is based on a scheme for systematic 
handling of abnormal situations arising from the use of disk 
storage devices. We are not aware of any other stable storage 
implementation that provides the abstraction of stable files 
which allows atomic reading and writing of variable length 
stable objects. In contrast to our approach most stable 
storage systems provide fixed size stable pages [Lampson79], 
[Svoboda8l), [Sturgis80). In these systems, operations of the 
stable storage system are atomic only if they involve just a 
single read/write operation on a fixed size page. However, 
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users often have the need to write blocks of data of varying 
sizes atomically. Our implementation supports atomic reading 
and writing of variable length objects and our prOVision of the 
abstraction of stable files instead of stable pages gives the 
stable storage system an interface which is fully familiar to 
the UNIX user. 
The stable storage system has been implemented on a UNIX-
based distributed system called UNIX United [Brownbridge82] 
which consists of a number of PDP/II computer systems connected 
by a Cambridge Ring local area network. The facilities 
described in this chapter are part of a prototype reliability 
subsystem associated with the Newcastle Connection software of 
our UNIX United system. The implementation technique used has 
been inspired by the system design methodology for fault 
tolerant systems developed by Cristian[Cristian83]. An excep-
tion handling software package described by Lee[Lee83] is used 
for handling detected exception occurrences. 
In the following section we give an overview of the system 
of which the stable storage system is a part. In section 3.3 
we describe the reliability issues which the stable storage 
system addresses. Section 3.4 
design notation which is used to 
presents the fault tolerance 
structure the standard and 
exceptional processing performed by a software component. It 
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also describes the exception handling package which is used to 
implement that notation. The stable storage implementation is 
presented in section 3.5 and section 3.6 contains some perfor-
mance measurements. In section 3.7 we discuss an alternative 
approach for implementing stable files in UNIX. Section 3.8 
provides some concluding remarks. (An example of how the fault 
tolerance design notation was implemented is given in an appen-
dix to this thesis.) 
3.2. OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEM 
This section gives a brief overview of the UNIX United 
distributed system[Brownbridge82] and describes how the stable 
storage system has been integrated into it. A UNIX United sys-
tem is usually made up of a (possibly large) set of standard 
UNIX systems interconnected by a communication network. The 
naming scheme used by such a system joins together the naming 
structures of the individual UNIX systems into a Single naming 
tree such that these component systems appear as directories in 
that naming tree. Such a system enables a legitimate user on 
any of the UNIX systems to access files or devices of any other 
component system within the UNIX United framework as though 
these devices were part of the user's own system. Depending on 
the need of a computing environment, some of the computers in a 
UNIX United system could be used as "stable servers" which pro-
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vide the services of a stable storage system. (Each computer 
could in fact provide both stable and ordinary disk storage 
facilities.) Figure 6 shows a possible position of a stable 
storage system in a UNIX United naming tree containing five 
UNIX systems UI, U2, U3, U4, US. 
(base) 
/ \ 
/ \ 
UI U4 
/ \ 
/ \ 
/ \ 
/ 
U2 
/ \ 
/ \ 
/ 
U3 
/ \ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
US(system providing 
/ \ stable storage) 
/ \ 
sf sf 
(stable files) 
Figure 6. An Example of a UNIX United Naming Tree 
Following normal UNIX naming convention, names starting with 
"/" indicate that the name starts at a root directory and the 
symbol " .• " is used to indicate a parent directory. The root of 
any process is at the UNIX system in which the user "logged in" 
unless the process changes its root with a "change root" com-
mand. From figure 6 it follows that a user process logged on 
to UNIX system U4 can access files in the stable storage system 
as "/US/sf". A user on U2 can access these files as 
"/ .. / .. /U4/US/sf". This implies that a user can access the 
stable storage system using standard UNIX system calls with the 
file-name being interpreted as a route through a naming tree, 
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each element specifying the next branch to be taken. If a leaf 
corresponding to a stable file is reached, the appropriate 
stable operations will be invoked rather than the normal UNIX 
operations. 
The UNIX United naming scheme is implemented by means of 
communication links and the inclusion of a software subsystem 
called the Newcastle Connection in each of the individual UNIX 
systems. This software subsystem is located between the UNIX 
kernel and the rest of the operating system and user programs. 
It intercepts system calls and determines which of the calls 
are local and which are for remote UNIX systems. It also incor-
porates UNIX servers which accept calls that have been re-
directed to it from other systems. Communication between the 
Connection layers in the individual UNIX systems is performed 
by a remote procedure call mechanism[Shrivastava82]. 
The Newcastle Connection software sends any file access 
requests to the UNIX server in the appropriate UNIX system. In 
our present prototype implementation of stable storage for 
UNIX, it is, for convenience, the UNIX server in each system 
that distinguishes between ordinary files and stable files and 
invokes the corresponding operations. Once the stable storage 
system is invoked by the UNIX server, it assumes that the files 
to be accessed are legitimate stable files. If those files are 
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not in fact stable files, the invocation will terminate abnor-
mally by raising exceptions. This UNIX server is presently 
invoked only for remote file accesses. Thus each machine which 
contains our prototype stable storage system is regarded as 
functioning just as a "server machine" for the other component 
UNIX systems. It is not intended to be used by local user 
processes. An alternative method of incorporating the stable 
storage mechanism into a component UNIX system would allow 
processes in that system, as well as remote processes, to use 
stable storage. This would involve local as well as remote 
file accesses being checked to distinguish between ordinary and 
stable files. This check would have to be incorporated in the 
"interception code" within each Newcastle Connection layer 
rather than in the UNIX servers. A fully general implementa-
tion would allow each component UNIX system to provide (local 
and remote) users with a mixture of conventional and stable 
storage. However our aim was to investigate the design of 
stable storage systems themselves and to provide a stable 
storage server facility for computers in a UNIX United system. 
The stable storage system sits on top of the UNIX kernel 
and is regarded as a user process by the kernel. The relation-
ship between the stable storage system, the Connection subsys-
tem and the UNIX kernel is shown schematically in figure 7. 
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UNIXI UNIX2 
Figure 7: Software Subsystem Relationship 
3 .3. REL IABIL ITY ISSUES 
Various faults can prevent a disk storage system from pro-
viding reliable service. A physical disk storage system is 
regarded as consisting of contiguous blocks of data. Access to 
the disk storage is provided by two functions: READ and WRITE. 
The actions performed by these operations are as follows: a 
successful read operation would read data from a disk, and also 
return the number of data bytes read. A successful write 
operation would change the existing disk state by writing the 
desired block of data on the specified disk. Unfortunately, 
due to processor crashes and physical decays of a disk storage 
system, read/write operations will not always succeed. 
(i) By a processor crash we mean any event which causes a 
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processor to lose the contents of its main store. The 
processor is also expected to stop its processing 
activities. 
(ii) We will say that there is a decay at an address on 
disk if we can not read from or write to that 
address. We will say that there is a transient decay, 
td, at some address, if initial attempts to read from 
and write to that address fail but a successful 
read/write operation is achieved within a predefined 
number of read/write retries. 
In addition to such processor crashes and decays there are 
other abnormal input/output situations to deal with. Most of 
the troublesome problems are associated with the write opera-
tion. For disks without read-after-write capability, there is 
no assurance that the data has been correctly written. For 
example 
(i) A write operation which returns successfully 
without changing the state of the disk is often 
not detected. 
(ii) There is the problem of a write operation which 
writes to the wrong address. 
(iii) A write operation which writes the wrong data to 
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the disk also presents a problem. 
(iv) There is also the possibility of a read/write 
operation which signals failure when the disk is 
not faulty. This failure is often due to transient 
I/O faults such as transient decays of disk 
storage devices. 
These are some of the issues which our implementation addresses 
to provide reliable storage of data. 
3.4. CONCEPTS AND NOTATION 
The need to provide well-structured and effective fault 
tolerance facilities [Anderson8l] led to our separation of the 
standard and exceptional processing performed by a software 
component in both the system description and implementation. We 
use a fault tolerance notation to describe the stable storage 
system and an exception handling software package to implement 
that notation. This section describes some of the concepts used 
in this chapter including the fault tolerance notation and its 
implementation. 
Our concept of an exception occurrence is based on those 
of Melliar-Smith and Randell [Melliar-Smith77] 
Cristian[Cristian82]. The service which a procedure or com-
ponent is intended to provide is implemented by a sequence of 
- 44 -
internal state transitions. This intended service can be speci-
fied by a binary relation INV over the initial and final 
states. If the final internal state s is the intended outcome 
of activating a component c in the initial state s·, then we 
say that 
(s', s) ~ INV 
An exception is said to have occurred if a procedure, when 
started in an initial state s', terminates in some final state 
s, such that 
(s ., s) t INV. 
A procedure either terminates normally or it terminates by sig-
nalling an exception. Once an exception is signalled, a handler 
associated with that exception is invoked, if such a handler 
has been provided. If no handler was provided, the exception 
is propagated to the the enclosing exception context, and then 
up the call-chain, until either a handler for the exception is 
found or the highest exception context is reached. The highest 
context will either handle the named exception, or it will 
indicate to its caller the failure of the software component by 
converting the exception into a "failure" exception. 
- 45 -
The notation which we use to describe the stable 
system is an adaptation of the notation 
storage 
used by 
Cristian[Cristian83]. Suppose c is a command or procedure 
which may signal a set E of exceptions. Then one can give the 
declaration: 
proc c SIGNALS E (PD) 
This is the procedure declaration construct, PD. It simply 
indicates that c has two exit points: a standard one and an 
exceptional one. If c is invoked in an initial state s' and 
terminates in a final state s such that (s' ,s) ~ INV then one 
can say that c terminates using the normal exit point otherwise 
c will be said to terminate using the exceptional exit point 
and an exception in E will be signalled. Only exceptions which 
appear after a "SIGNALS" clause are visible outside a pro-
cedure. All other exceptions are internal exceptions which are 
detected and handled within the procedure itself. 
The next construct is the exceptional continuation construct, 
EX. Let H be a set of handlers associated with E. The con-
struct 
c[E: :H] (EX) 
says that if any invocation of c detects an exception in E, 
then the standard continuation of c is to be replaced by an 
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exceptional continuation by invoking a handler in H. A handler 
in H may be a (possibly empty) sequence of operations and may 
itself signal an exception. 
The R (repetition) construct 
(N)C[OTHERS::OH; E::H] (R) 
will be used as an abbreviation of the n-depth repetition 
c[OTHERS::OH; E::c[ •.. c[OTHERS::OH; E::H]]] 
The semantics of the R construct are as follows: Suppose there 
is a special exception called OTHERS which is an element of E, 
and a handler OH in H, which is associated with OTHERS. Let N 
be an integer constant with value N ~ 1. Then if any invoca-
tion of c signals the exception OTHERS, the handler OH is 
immediately called. However, if the invocation of c signals an 
exception in E which is not OTHERS, then the handler action 
will consist of invoking c again. This repetition is continued 
until N successive c invocations persistently signal exceptions 
in E (that is not OTHERS), at which point a handler in H asso-
ciated with that exception is invoked. Otherwise, if for some 
i, l~i~, an invocation of c terminates normally, then (R) ter-
minates without further handler action being initiated and 
hence, without further retries. Although OTHERS is an element 
of E, it demands special treatment when detected, namely, that 
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the repetition loop be exited. This enables us to deal with 
exceptions which, when detected, indicate that further retries 
will be futile and that a handler is to be invoked without com-
pleting the repetition loop. 
3.4.2. Implementation of Notation 
The fault tolerance notation was implemented using the 
exception software package described by Lee[Lee83]. This pack-
age is actually a set of macros for the C language. The basic 
structure of a program using the exception package is shown in 
Figure 8. 
BEGIN /* beginning of an exception context*/ 
if condition-true then 
exc-raise«exception name» 
/*normal code*/ 
EXCEPTION /* beginning of exception handlers*/ 
WHEN«exception name» 
WHEN«exception name» 
END /* end of exception context*/ 
Fig. 8. 
The notation [E::H] establishes an exception context and is 
implemented by the BEGIN and END primitives of the exception 
package. The EXCEPTION and END clauses of the exception pack-
age indicate the beginning and ending respectively of the 
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handlers in H which are associated with an exception context. 
After executing BEGIN, and if no exceptions are raised, the 
exception context is exited and control passes to the code fol-
lowing the END statement. If an exception is raised between the 
BEGIN and EXCEPTION statements, control passes to the appropri-
ate WHEN clause, and the associated handling code is executed, 
at the end of which control passes to the END statement. The 
interested reader is referred to[Lee83], which describes the 
package fully. 
3 • 5 • STABLE STORAGE IMPLEMENTATION 
Several physical disk storage devices which, we assume, 
are characterised by inherent unreliability due to electrical 
and mechanical interferences, can be converted into a reliable 
device for storing data by the implementation of a stable 
storage system. The stable storage system we have implemented 
is intended to provide the abstraction of reliable virtual dev-
ices with the property that transient input/output faults and 
decays are not visible to the user. This is achieved by imple-
menting stable files and providing reliable atomic variable 
length read/write operations for accessing these files instead 
of the usual read/write operations for a disk storage device 
whose atomicity is guaranteed only if they operate on fixed 
size pages. 
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The operations that constitute the interface to the stable 
storage system are organised as a set of server processes. 
These server processes are structured as two successive levels 
of abstraction, each level eliminating the effects of some set 
of undesired events associated with the disk storage. The first 
layer, called the transient layer, masks transient I/O faults. 
The second layer is the stable layer, which uses the virtual 
devices produced by the transient layer to construct a better 
behaved set of devices by providing facilities for tolerating 
decays and crashes. The following section presents the basic 
information structure used by the stable storage system, namely 
stable files, and the stable operations which use these files. 
3.5.1. Stable Files 
A stable file looks to the user just like an ordinary UNIX 
file. It is physically represented by an ordered pair of UNIX 
files held on two different disk storage devices. (The pair of 
files could have been stored on the same disk storage device if 
there were any means of ensuring that the files are not "decay 
related"). A stable file in our environment is read and written 
using standard UNIX system calls. A stable read operation 
reads from the first file and if that read operation is not 
successful, it reads from the second file. A stable write 
operation writes to each of the pair of files. The details of 
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these operations are given in section 3.5.2. 
The problem we addressed was to provide the user with 
variable length atomic read/write operations which can be used 
to access data blocks of varying Sizes and which incorporate 
crash recovery facilities for these variable length objects. 
Disk storage devices provide a weak atomicity property for 
fixed size pages such that a write operation to these pages is 
either written completely or not at all, unless a failure 
occurs while the disk's write head is turned on. If such a 
failure occurs, the data on the disk will be detectably bad and 
error detecting codes which are written with every disk page 
will reveal this fault when the page is read. Such physical 
hardware does not however guarantee atomicity of read/write 
operations on variable length blocks of data. To provide this 
facility we implemented the abstraction of stable files, and 
provided a means of crash recovery for these files. It is the 
means of crash recovery that dictated the structure of the 
stable file. 
In a fixed page environment, a stable page is usually 
represented by two fixed size pages. If a failure should occur 
during a write operation to the pair of pages, we assume that 
the pages will be in one of the following states: 
(i) Both pages contain valid data (even though the data 
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might be different). 
(ii) One of the pages is detectab1y bad and the other is 
accessible and contains valid data. 
In case (i) if the contents of the two pages are different, 
crash recovery would consist of copying one of the pages to the 
other. The preference is usually to copy the first page to the 
other page so that the most recent update is reflected. In 
case (ii) the good page is copied to the detectably bad page. 
Unlike the fixed page Situation, a variable length write 
operation can be interrupted by a crash resulting in only a 
part of an object being written. It is usually not known which 
object was being written when a crash occurred. After a proces-
sor crash, in a variable length environment, the pair of 
objects forming a stable object will be assumed to be in one of 
the following states. 
(i) Both objects have valid data (which may be dif-
ferent). 
(ii) One of the objects has valid data and the other is 
detectably bad. 
(iii) One of the objects is valid and the other is 
invalid but it is not known which object contains 
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valid data. 
In case (ii) a crash occurred while the disk write heads were 
turned on thereby corrupting the data which is stored on the 
disk. The data is detectably bad and the error correcting codes 
will reveal this fault when the data is read. In case (iii), a 
write operation to one of the two objects was interrupted by a 
crash resulting in only part of the data being written. The 
data on the disk is not detectably bad though the data is in an 
inconsistent state. Since it is not known which object was 
being written when a crash occurred, it follows that we do not 
know which object contains inconsistent data. This is unlike 
the fixed page environment where we assume that the data on the 
disk is either consistent or is detectably bad. In the vari-
able length situation it is therefore necessary to determine, 
for purposes of crash recovery, the consistency status of each 
of the two objects that represent a stable object. The fixed 
page solution which copies anyone of the pages to the other 
page when it is determined that the pages are not detectably 
bad is not suitable in environments where variable length 
objects need to be written atomically. If we do not know which 
of the objects is consistent, copying one of the objects to the 
other could mean copying the inconsistent object to the con-
sistent object thereby making both objects inconsistent. 
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TO solve this problem, we considered times tamping each 
write operation. A timestamp would indicate to us the write 
operations that belong together but will not necessarily enable 
us to determine which write operation was completed and which 
was interrupted. One approach to timestamping every update 
operation would mean having timestamps scattered in the file. 
We decided that this was undesirable since we regard a file to 
be a data entity which has a meaning to the user. Alterna-
tively, these time stamps could be kept transparent to the user 
by storing them in another file which in turn has to be made 
stable. This would increase the number of accesses to a disk 
storage device and hence the time spent in carrying out each 
stable operation. The overhead was considered to be excessive 
so this approach was not pursued further. Another possibility 
involved circulating a token between the two files of a stable 
file such that only the consistent file holds the token. This 
scheme was found unsuitable for our purposes because sometimes 
the two files representing a stable file are both consistent 
and the file which does not hold the token may be falsely con-
sidered inconsistent. 
We used instead what we called a "moving tag" to solve 
this problem. A "moving tag" is a concatenation of any small 
set of characters such that the resulting string is assumed (as 
is the case with "end of file characters") not to occur 
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naturally in the user's file. Each logical write operation 
writes a tag onto a stable file after the successful completion 
of its operation. A subsequent write operation would overwrite 
the tag written by the previous write operation while writing 
its data. The tag is therefore in effect removed by each I09i-
cal write operation and always reinstated at the end of file. 
It was the removal and reinstatement of the tag that led to the 
name "the moving tag". This scheme has the desirable property 
that at any given time, only one tag is found on a stable file 
and this tag is located at the end of the file, as opposed to 
having timestamps on every block of data. The stable read rou-
tine keeps the tag transparent to the user. A user therefore 
sees a stable file as an ordinary UNIX file. After a processor 
crash, a stable file which is inconsistent with respect to a 
user's request would contain no tag. In such a case, the crash 
recovery routine would be called to restore the consistency of 
the stable file. 
A:-----------------------------
al a2 a3 a4 
.------------1-----------1---1-----------1---1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 data 1 data Itagl Itagl 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1------------1-----------1---1-----------1---1 
bl b2 b3 
B:--------------------
Figure 9: Two logical write requests. 
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The stable storage system sometimes has to carry out 
several physical write operations in order to satisfy a user's 
single (variable length) logical write request. Each such phy-
sical write operation writes only fixed size blocks and the 
atomicity of these operations is guaranteed by the disk 
hardware. Figure 9 shows two write system calls issued by a 
user. The first request, which we call the A-write, is to 
write the set of bytes starting at al and ending at a3. The 
stable storage system splits this request into three physical 
write operations (aI, a2), (a2, a3) and (a3, a4). The opera-
tion which writes (a3,a4) constitutes the writing of the tag. 
The second write request (called the B-write) is to write the 
set of bytes starting at bl and ending at b2. In order to 
satisfy this request, the stable storage system carries out two 
physical write operations (bl, b2) and (b2, b3). The B-write 
overwrites the tag written by the A-write by starting its write 
operation at a3 instead of a4. 
Let us consider the effects on figure 9 of a fault such as 
a processor crash which could interrupt a write operation. The 
problem is to ensure that the A-write and the B-write, which 
are variable length stable write operations, are atomic. The 
following are the various scenarios when the operations in fig-
ure 9 are interrupted by a crash. A crash can occur after a2, 
a3, a4, b2 or b3. A crash is not expected to occur between ai 
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and aj nor between bi and bj (where j = i + 1), since these 
operations are guaranteed to be written atomically by hardware. 
If a crash occurs after a2, a3 or b2, the stable file must be 
considered inconsistent since either a logical write operation 
has been started but not yet completed or a tag has not yet 
been written to confirm its completion. The inconsistency will 
be clearly indicated by the absence of the tag. In such a 
case, the crash recovery routine (which is invoked by the sys-
tem manager after a crash) will restore the consistency of the 
stable file. If a crash occurs before al or after a4 or b3, the 
stable file will be considered consistent since each logical 
write operation has either not been started or has been com-
pleted. In all cases, the atomicity of the variable length 
stable write operation is always guaranteed. How the crash 
recovery routine restores the consistency of a stable file is 
described in section 3.5.2.2. 
This scheme is most efficient when the stable file is an 
append-only data structure. supporting random access write 
operations would require writing the data at a specified 
address and then writing the tag at the end of the file. This 
extension is trivial but would increase the time which is spent 
in carrying out a write operation. Another observation is that 
most disk hardware systems do not write across block boun-
daries. Consequently the writing of the tag will in effect 
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constitute the writing of one physical block which is then 
overwritten by the next write operation. 
3.5.2. Stable Operations 
We shall now describe the implementation of stable opera-
tions using the notation of section 3.4.1. An example of how 
this notation was implemented using the exception handling 
package described in section 3.4.2 is given in an appendix to 
this thesis. The stable operations are organised as two levels 
of abstraction called the Transient and Stable layers. 
3.5.2.1. Transient Layer Implementation 
The transient layer implements the server processes which 
constitute the first level of abstraction of the stable storage 
system. This layer masks transient I/O faults. It consists of 
two procedures, Tread and Twrite. The operations on this layer 
use the primitives provided by the UNIX kernel to produce a 
better behaved set of operations by performing read-retries and 
by providing a read-after-write capability for their write 
operations. The procedures Tread and Twrite are invoked by the 
stable layer and are not intended to be invoked directly by 
users. 
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Proc Tread(fd:inti buf:array[ .•. ] of chari nbytes:int) SIGNALS 
RD-FAIL, DISKERR, OTHERS:exceptioni 
var fd: inti 
begin 
RD-FAILi 
(N)read(fd,buf,nbytes) [OTHERS::SIGNAL RD-FAILi 
DISKERR::report,SIGNAL RD-FAIL]i 
end. 
Procedure Tread masks transient read errors. The meaning of 
the read statement in the procedure Tread is the following. If 
a read operation fails, Tread would perform read-retries until 
a read operation succeeds, up to a maximum of N read-retries. 
The value chosen for N is determined by previous observation of 
the average latency period for transient faults on disks. If 
any of the read operations fails due to a fault that is not a 
disk fault (that is, if an OTHERS exception is detected), Tread 
terminates by signalling the read-failure exception, RD-FAIL, 
without making further read-retries. If all its retry attempts 
persistently detect a disk fault (DISKERR) , then Tread writes 
an error report (intended for the maintenance engineer) and 
then signals read-failure. 
Proc Twrite(fd:inti buf:array[ ... ] of chari nbytes:int)SIGNALS 
WRT-FAIL; 
OTHERS,DISKERR,WRT-FAIL:exceptioni 
var fd: inti 
begin 
end 
(N)write read(fd,buf,nbytes)[OTHERS::SIGNAL WRT-FAILi 
DISKERR::report, 
SIGNAL WRT-FAIL]; 
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Procedure Twrite masks the effects of transient write errors. 
It repeatedly performs a write followed by a read until 
(i) the value read is equal to the value written, thereby 
confirming that the data was written successfully, or 
(ii) until it has attempted N write-read retries. 
This provides a read-after-write capability for disks that do 
not have this facility. It masks the effects of bad writes, 
i.e. those which write wrong values to the disk. It detects 
write operations which write to the wrong address and write 
errors which do not change the disk state. If any of its 
write-followed-by-read operations fail due to a fault that is 
not a disk fault then Twrite will terminate by signalling the 
write-fail exception, WRT-FAIL. Furthermore, if all its retry 
attempts fail, it writes a report (intended for the maintenance 
engineer) and terminates exceptionally by signalling a write-
fail exception. 
3.5.2.2. Stable Layer Implementation 
The stable layer implements the second level of abstrac-
tion of the stable storage system. It provides fault tolerance 
facilities for decays and processor crashes by using file 
replication. It also provides file replication transparency so 
as to conform to a uniform interface with UNIX system calls. 
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The stable layer uses the better behaved operations provided by 
the transient layer instead of the ordinary operations provided 
by the UNIX kernel. It consists of the routines Sread, Swrite 
and Crec. Sread and Swrite are the routines which are used to 
read from and write to stable files on behalf of the user. 
These two routines are normally invoked by the user. However, 
in our environment, the stable storage system is kept tran-
sparent to the user. The user invokes what he thinks is the 
UNIX read/write operation which in fact is the Newcastle Con-
nection read/write operation. This operation activates the file 
server in the appropriate UNIX system which then invokes the 
appropriate Sread and Swrite operation of the stable storage 
system. 
Proc Sread(fdp:int; buf:array[ ... ] of char; nbytes:int)SIGNALS 
SRD-FAIL; 
SRO-FAIL,OISKl-BAO,OISK2-BAO:exception; 
var fdl,fd2:int; 
begin 
end 
Tread(fdl, buf, nbytes) [OISKl-BAO::Tread(fd2, buf, nbytes) 
[OISK2-BAD::SIGNAL SRD-FAIL]]; 
The procedure Sread reads from the first disk by using the 
file descriptor fdl. If this is unsuccessful, it reads from the 
second disk using the file descriptor fd2. If the read from 
the second disk fails, Sread terminates by signalling a 
stable-read-fail exception, SRD-FAIL. As we shall see later, 
the activities of the crash recovery routine ensure that 
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failures of the stable read/write operations rarely occur. 
Proc Swrite(fdp:int;buf:array[] of char;nbytes:int)SIGNALS 
SWRT-FAIL; DISK1-BAD, DISK2-BAD: exception; 
var fd1,fd2: inti 
begin 
SWRT-FAIL; 
Twrite(fd1, buf, nbytes) [DISK1-BAD::SIGNAL SWRT-FAIL]; 
Twrite(fd2, buf, nbytes)[DISK2-BAD::report]; 
end. 
The procedure Swrite writes to the two disks, which have 
file descriptors fdl, fd2. If the write operation to the first 
disk fails however, the write operation to the second disk is 
not initiated and Swrite terminates exceptionally by signalling 
a stable-write-fai1 exception, SWRT-FAIL. This helps ensure 
that not more than one disk can be damaged following a crash 
which occurs during a write operation. However, care must be 
taken to ensure that when a stable write operation returns, the 
data has actually been written to the disk and not buffered by 
the operating system. This is achieved by either communicating 
directly with the disk in "raw mode"[Ritchie79] or by forcing 
the system write buffers to be flushed after each write opera-
tion. Flushing the system write buffers was found to be expen-
sive and therefore undesirable. Our approach involves using 
disks which can be divided into several virtual disks. These 
virtual disks are treated as real devices by the operating sys-
tern and as files by the stable storage system. This enables us 
to obtain several files on one physical disk while retaining 
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the capability to address these files in "raw mode" by 
transferring information between the user's core image and the 
device without the use of the UNIX buffering mechanism. 
Proc Crec(fdl,fd2:int) SIGNALS DI-LOST,D2-LOST,ALL-LOST; 
DI-LOST, D2-LOST, ALL-LOST,WRT-FAIL,RD-FAIL:exception; 
fdl,fd2,nbytes: inti 
sl, s2: boolean initially false; /*decay switches*/ 
ctagl, ctag2: boolean initially false; 
/*consistency status indicator*/ 
bufl,buf2: array[ ..• ] of char; 
begin 
/*check for conSistency tag */ 
if filel contains a consistency tag, set ctagl True; 
if file2 contains a consistency tag, set ctag2 True; 
if (ctagl and ctag2 ) then 
/*both files good: upon reading if you encounter 
detectably bad file, copy good to bad*/ 
repeat 
Tread(fdl, bufl, nbytes)[RD-FAIL:: sl]; 
Tread(fd2, buf2, nbytes)[RD-FAIL:: s2]; 
if sl /*filel is detectably bad*/ 
then Twrite(fdl, buf2, nbytes)[WRT-FAIL:: ALL-LOST] 
else Twrite(fd2, bufl, nbytes)[WRT-FAIL::ALL-LOST]; 
until eof 
/*note that we assume that both disks will 
not be bad at the same time*/ 
else if ctagl then /*first file good; read from the first 
file, write to the second */ 
repeat 
Tread(fdl, bufl, nbytes)[RD-FAIL::SIGNAL ALL-LOST]; 
Twrite(fd2, bufl, nbytes) [WRT-FAIL::SIGNAL D2-LOST]; 
until eof 
else if ctag2 then 
repeat 
Tread(fd2, buf2, nbytes)[RD-FAIL:: SIGNAL ALL-LOST]; 
Twrite(fdl, buf2, nbytes) [WRT-FAIL:: SIGNAL DI-LOST]; 
until eof; 
end 
The crash recovery routine Crec implements the crash 
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recovery facilities of the stable storage system. It is invoked 
by the system manager to restore the consistency of stable 
files. Its action is applied to each file on a disk after a 
crash, before the system restarts normal operation. The system 
manager also invokes this routine periodically after every time 
interval Tu, for maintenance purposes. The determination of Tu 
depends on previous observation of the system, which will indi-
cate approximately how often a decay is expected to occur on a 
disk. To perform crash recovery, Crec first determines the 
consistency status of each file by searching for the con-
sistency tag at the end of a file. If a stable file is found 
to be inconsistent (which means that one of the two files 
representing a stable file does not have a tag) this routine 
copies the consistent file (with a tag) to the inconsistent 
file. If each of the two files contains a consistency tag, the 
crash recovery routine will try to copy all readable blocks of 
data from the first file to the second file. This copying of 
one consistent file to another is for maintenance purposes, and 
helps to ensure that all blocks of data on the two files are 
readable. If a block of data from the first file is not read-
able (i.e. is detectably bad) then the crash recovery routine 
would copy the block of data from the second file to the first 
file and vice versa. If Crec can not complete its operations 
due to the existence of permanent decays, appropriate reports 
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are issued to the maintenance engineer who, we hope, initiates 
repair operations on the affected disk. 
Our fault assumptions are that there will be no more than 
one decay on the same disk within a time interval Tu and that 
no more than one of the disks is bad at the same time. If we 
can assume that necessary repairs will be effected within time 
Tu of detection of faults, then the stable storage system can 
be said to provide "failure-free" disks. This is because once 
one disk becomes bad, the second disk can not (by our assump-
tion) become bad within a time interval Tu. Within this time 
interval, the crash recovery routine Crec would have been 
invoked by the system manager to correct any damage due to 
transient decays and crashes, and repairs would have been 
effected by the maintenance engineer. The practicality of the 
assumption that repairs can be effected within a suitable time 
interval Tu can certainly be questioned. However it might not 
be unreasonable in certain environments. 
3.5.2.3. Other Stable Operations 
We also found it necessary to implement a stable version 
of some other operations that use disk storage. The existence 
of these stable operations is however transparent to the user. 
The following routines were implemented: 
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Stable-Open, Stable-Close, Stable-Lseek, Stable-Creat. 
These routines are called by the stable storage system in 
response to the users' open, close, lseek, and creat system 
calls. Interested 
documents [Ritchie79] 
readers 
for more 
are referred 
information on 
to 
these 
calls. The stable storage system requires that pairs of 
UNIX 
system 
disks 
should be mounted for stable operations. If this requirement is 
not met stable operations would fail. 
3.6. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS 
Some initial tests were carried out to assess the perfor-
mance of the stable storage system. These tests were performed 
on a PDP-ll/45 running V7 UNIX and using RK05 and RLOl disks. 
The aim was to compare the disk access times for ordinary disk 
storage and stable storage. The time spent in reading and 
writing SOk bytes of data from an ordinary file and from a 
stable file were recorded and compared. Data blocks of varying 
sizes ranging from 64 to 2048 bytes were used. The UNIX "time" 
facility was used to obtain time measurements to the nearest 
millisecond. Table I contains the results from these perfor-
mance tests. The figures in table I are averages calculated 
from the results of several experiments. 
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I UNIX I stable I UNIX I stable Iblock sizel total no. I 
I read I read I write I write lin bytes I of bytes I 
I (sec) I (sec) I (sec) I (sec) I I I 
1-------1--------1--------1--------1----------1------------1 
120.40 I 20.60 I 20.40 I 84.880 I 64 I 50k I 
1-------1--------1--------1--------1----------1------------1 
110.60 I 10.80 I 10.80 I 44.740 I 128 I 50k 1 
1-------1--------1--------1--------1----------1------------1 
I 5.60 I 5.80 I 5.80 I 24.600 I 256 I 50k 1 
1-------1--------1--------1--------1----------1------------1 
I 2.580 I 2.60 I 2.600 I 13.620 I 512 I 50k 1 
1-------1--------1--------1--------1----------1------------1 
1 1.340 1 1.360 1 1.360 1 13.120 I 1024 I 50k I 
1-------1--------1--------1--------1----------1------------1 
10.720 I 0.740 I 0.720112.680 I 2048 I 50k I 
Table I 
Data Access Times for UNIX and Stable read/write Operations 
We observed that the time required by the stable read 
operation is approximately equal to the time required by the 
UNIX read operation when exceptions are not encountered (the 
average overhead was roughly 2%). For the write operation, the 
access time ratio of the stable write operation to the UNIX 
write operation is approximately 1:4 for block sizes up to 512 
bytes. The 1:4 ratio is due largely to the fact that the 
stable write operation uses a better behaved write operation 
provided by the transient layer instead of the ordinary UNIX 
kernel primitive. This provides the facility for writing atomi-
cally variable length stable objects and a read-after-write 
capability for each write operation to the two files that make 
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up a stable file. Fragmentation of larger blocks of data into 
512 byte blocks by the transient layer also makes the stable 
write operation much slower than the ordinary UNIX write opera-
tion when block sizes which are larger than 512 bytes are used. 
The 1:4 ratio is generally maintained if the transient layer 
operations read and write larger blocks of data. In our 
environment, a weak atomicity of operations which write 512 
byte blocks is provided by the operating system therefore 
blocks which were larger than 512 bytes were fragmented so as 
to use this atomicity facility. 
From these figures it can be seen that applications which 
perform mostly read operations pay a very small price for using 
the stable storage system. On the other hand, for applications 
which are writing most of the time, using the stable storage 
system could account for a substantial increase in overheads. 
Accurate figures on the ratio of read to write system calls are 
not presently available, so it is difficult to estimate how 
large an overhead the general use of the stable storage system 
would impose. Wyeth [Wyeth73], in his simulation of a recursive 
cache mechanism, analysed the references to shared resources in 
a set of sequential programs and his figures showed that read 
operations occurred about three times as frequently as write 
operations. Applying his results to disk storage would suggest 
that the proportion of read accesses will generally be fairly 
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high. Figures from table I indicate that there would be a 
minimal performance degradation of about 80% when the stable 
storage system is used. This applies to tasks which perform 
only read and write operations. However, systems differ greatly 
in the extent to which disk operations dominate the average 
workload. For most applications where disk operations do not 
dominate the workload the use of the stable storage system will 
rarely be noticed on the user level. 
3.7. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
This implementation avoided a direct use of the UNIX file 
system by implementing stable files as virtual disks which are 
treated as devices by the operating system. Our aim was to 
provide a stable storage server as an independent facility 
which is not embedded in the operating system. An alternative 
approach would be to provide robustness while using the UNIX 
file system by making the UNIX file system itself crash resis-
tant. This would require kernel modifications in order that 
system file management information (such as i-nodes) can be 
accessed and made stable. We would also then have to deal with 
the problems posed by the use of the UNIX buffering mechanism 
which forms the block-device interface. Such an implementation 
would have the advantages of utilising fully the facilities 
provided by the UNIX file system. The next chapter addresses 
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these issues and discusses the implementation of a crash resis-
tant file system. 
3.8. CONCLUSION 
This prototype stable storage implementation has provided 
a facility which helps maintain the consistency of data stored 
on disk storage devices. Through the use of systematic han-
dling of abnormal situations it has provided Simple, reliable 
and efficient stable operations which can be used to build 
arbitrarily large atomic actions needed at the application 
level. The provision of the abstraction of stable files 
extends the domain of reliability facilities available to the 
UNIX user. 
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4. A CRASH RESISTANT UNIX FILE SYSTEM 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the second stage in our approach to 
the construction of a reliable data storage system. It 
describes the modifications which were made to the UNIX kernel 
to support a crash resistant file system and the associated 
recovery facilities for maintaining the internal consistency of 
files despite the failure of the host processor, transient 
hardware failures and decay of the storage medium. 
Chapter 3 described a stable storage system which provided 
stable disks as an independent facility which was not embedded 
in an operating system. The stable storage system was imple-
mented as a set of user processes which meant that there were 
no modifications to the UNIX kernel. The aim of that implemen-
tation was to provide reliable disks for storing user data. 
The client of such an implementation is the user. However, 
there is also a need to make the operating system a client to a 
reliable disk storage system. By this we mean that, as with 
the user, the operating system has a need to store system 
information on reliable storage. There is the need, for 
instance, to make file management information (such as i-nodes 
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in UNIX) crash resistant. In environments where there is the 
need to provide reliable disk storage facilities which can be 
used by both the user and the operating system, a crash resis-
tant UNIX file system will have to be implemented. 
Various faults could harm the integrity of the data which 
is stored by a file system. A processor crash is an example of 
a system failure which could affect the consistency of stored 
data. Such a failure could lead to the loss of information 
which was available before the failure occurred. This loss of 
information would make the data which is stored by the file 
system inconsistent. Consider the problem of an operating sys-
tem whose I/O subsystem employs a buffering mechanism so as to 
reduce the amount of physical I/O operations on disk storage 
devices. The use of such a mechanism may give rise to delayed 
write operations. If a processor crash should occur, there 
could be logically complete but physically incomplete I/O 
requests in the buffers. These buffered I/O requests will be 
destroyed. The inconsistency in the file system arises due to 
the fact that the user's view of the disk is different from the 
actual disk state. Section 3.7 of the previous chapter com-
mented on the need for a crash resistant file system which is 
capable of providing reliable file service despite the use of a 
buffering mechanism by a file system. This chapter describes 
the implementation of such a crash resistant file system on 
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stable disks. By a crash resistant file system we mean a sys-
tem whose operations are such that 
(i) their effects would survive a crash and 
(ii) the effects of an uncompleted crash resistant opera-
tion will be undone by a recovery routine. 
In order to provide a crash resistant file system it is 
necessary to provide stable disks as well as to ensure that the 
activities which are involved in managing files do not intro-
duce data inconsistency. The consistency of a stable storage 
system does not imply the consistency of a file system which is 
implemented on it. As has already been observed, the use of a 
buffering mechanism by a file system could introduce data 
inconsistency if buffered I/O requests are lost during a pro-
cessor crash. Some system file management information is not 
accessible to user processes. Kernel modifications are there-
fore necessary in order to make such information crash resis-
tant and to ensure that the kernel invokes crash resistant 
operations for both system and user functions. The implementa-
tion described here addresses these issues and makes the neces-
sary kernel modifications needed to make the UNIX file system 
crash resistant. It also uses a numbering scheme to avoid 
replication of disks which store short lived data for which 
crash resistance is not desired, such as swapping devices. 
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Although the idea of using crash resistant files is 
attractive, there have not been many accounts describing how to 
make an already existing file system crash resistant. The 
proper placement of reliability facilities in an existing sys-
tem so as to provide effective fault tolerance is not usually 
clear. The UNIX operating system is widely used for research 
in operating systems and the use of stable storage is advocated 
by many workers [Lampson79], [Svoboda8l], [Cristian83]. We 
therefore believe that the implementation of a crash resistant 
UNIX file system which is based on the use of the abstraction 
of stable storage will be of interest to people in the area of 
reliable computing. 
Section 4.2 gives a general description of the UNIX file 
system and its associated I/O subsystem. It examines UNIX file 
operations and their reliability problems. Section 4.3 
describes the implementation of the crash resistant system. 
Performance measurements and analysis are given in section 4.4 
and section 4.5 presents some desired extensions. Concluding 
remarks are given in section 4.6. 
4.2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIX FILE SYSTEM 
Our intention is to implement the UNIX file system on 
stable disks and to make it crash resistant. This section 
therefore gives a brief description of that file system and its 
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associated I/O subsystem. A reader who is interested in a 
deeper understanding of the UNIX file system would find the 
presentation in[Thompson78] on the "UNIX File System Implemen-
tation" helpful. 
The basic function of a file system is to divide disk 
storage into units which we call files. Unlike many operating 
systems which provide flat file systems, UNIX provides a tree-
structured hierarchical file system. The nodes in the tree are 
directories and the leaves are files. A file in UNIX is an 
unstructured finite sequence of characters. A directory is a 
file which contains a list of file names and a set of numbers 
used to access system information on files. Directories are 
used to impose a hierarchical structure on the file name space 
since every file or directory (except root) appears in some 
directory. The base of this tree structure is the root direc-
tory. 
Files are named in the form of a path name which is a 
sequence of directory names separated by "j" and ending in a 
file name. If a name begins with a "/" a search for the file 
begins in the root directory otherwise the search begins in the 
user's current working directory_ For example, the name 
"/jo/doc/myfile" requires that the root directory be searched 
for a directory named "jo" and "jo" is to be searched for the 
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directory "doc". The directory "doc" is then searched for a 
file which is called "myfile". 
A UNIX user sees the file system as a hierarchical struc-
ture. However, below this hierarchy of directories is a flat 
file system implemented by the list of file definitions (i-
nodes). These file definitions contain most of the information 
about files such as the location of a file, length of a file, 
access mode, owner and creation date. Below the flat file sys-
tern is the block I/O system which carries out physical I/O 
operations on devices. After this comes the physical hardware. 
Fig. 10 shows the relationship between the various subsystems. 
Hierarchical File system 
Flat File System 
Block and Character I/O System 
Physical Hardware 
Figure 10: I/O Subsystems 
Most of the reliability problems which we will be discuss-
ing occur at the interface between the block I/O system and the 
flat file system. 
4.2.1. The Block I/O System 
The block I/O system refers to devices that can be 
addressed in blocks of 512 bytes (or 1024 bytes in some 
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versions of UNIX). This applies mostly to disk and tape dev-
ices. Devices that do not fall into the block I/O category 
such as communication lines and line printers belong to the 
character I/O system. 
The block devices use a buffering mechanism which enables 
the kernel to reduce physical I/O traffic to these devices. 
The buffers act as a data cache and are searched whenever a 
read request is issued. If the desired block is available in 
the buffers, the data is made available to the user without 
phYSical I/O being performed. Blocks which are frequently 
accessed are retained in the buffers to reduce I/O traffic. A 
write operation involves acquiring a buffer, filling it with 
data and carrying out the physical transfer of data between the 
buffer and the device. The transfer of data between the buffer 
and the device need not be done in the same order as that in 
which the requests were issued by the user. System efficiency 
considerations may also require that this transfer be deferred. 
The phYSical transfer of data is then carried out at a later 
time by the file system. A return from a write system call may 
therefore take place before the physical I/O operation is car-
ried out. 
The asynchronous nature of the algorithms in the block I/O 
interface make error reporting and error handling difficult. 
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Secondly, altering the physical I/O sequence from that of the 
logical I/O sequence requested by the user could sometimes 
result in data being written in the wrong order. The adverse 
effects of processor crashes on the write operation which is 
implemented by this interface has already been mentioned. 
These problems led to a desire to implement crash resistant 
file operations which use redundant disk hardware (i.e. stable 
disks) to provide a more reliable file service. 
4.3. THE CRASH RESISTANT SYSTEM 
A number of changes were made to the UNIX kernel to sup-
port crash resistant file operations. 
(i) The device driver software was modified to incor-
porate management of replicated disks in the form 
of stable disks. 
(ii) The UNIX buffering mechanism was modified so as to 
provide a more reliable write operation and 
(iii) A crash recovery routine is provided on the user 
level 
The aim was to implement file operations such that the 
effects of a completed operation would always survive a crash. 
In a reliable file system, the acknowledgement that a user 
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would expect for a write request is that the data has been 
received and has been safely stored (in stable storage). This 
is in contrast to an ordinary file system which could simply 
acknowledge the receipt of the data. Such a response might not 
be adequate for a user of a reliable file system. Rather, 
there is a need to know that the request has been acted upon. 
To achieve these objectives, each operation once started must 
wait for the physical Ilo to be completed before returning to 
the caller. Replication of disks is used to ensure that if an 
operation is interrupted by a crash, an earlier consistent disk 
state will be available for crash recovery purposes. The crash 
recovery routine is invoked to restore the consistency of disk 
data structures before the system restarts normal operation 
after a processor crash had occurred. 
The operations of the crash resistant file system are 
implemented on three levels of abstraction: the disk level, the 
file level and the user level. The disk and file levels are 
embedded in the UNIX kernel. The disk level implements the 
abstraction of stable disks. The second level, namely the file 
level, implements the UNIX file system concepts (with its asso-
ciated i-nodes and directory system) on the stable disks pro-
vided by the disk level. A crash recovery operation is provided 
on the user level. The following subsections discuss the 
details of each of the three levels. 
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4.3.1. Disk Level: Implementation of Stable Disks 
The description of a stable storage system has been given 
in chapter 3. That chapter described an implementation of the 
stable storage system as a set of user processes. This section 
describes how the stable storage mechanism was reimplemented in 
the UNIX kernel. It was necessary to first provide stable 
operations in the kernel and then to interface the UNIX file 
system with stable disks so as to provide a crash resistant 
file system. Unlike the implementation in chapter 3 the prOVi-
sion of these facilities in the kernel ensures that these 
operations will be invoked by the kernel for both user data and 
system management information thereby providing stability for 
both types of data. Provision of these facilities required ker-
nel modifications. The operations implemented by a user-level 
stable storage system such as those of chapter 3 are not 
expected to be invoked by the kernel when writing system data. 
The aim there was to provide stability for user data only and 
no kernel modification was necessary. Also, the provision of a 
stable storage system is only a part of what is needed in order 
to support a crash resistant file system. 
Each stable disk which is implemented by the disk level 
consists of a pair of conventional disks which are numbered by 
a sequential pair of even and odd integers. Operations on this 
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level are atomic. This means that they are either successfully 
completed or the effects of such operations are undone by a 
crash recovery routine. A write operation to a stable disk 
first writes the information to the even numbered disk and then 
to the odd numbered disk. The following program implements 
read and write operations for the disk level. 
Writed ( 
begin 
acquire a free buffer; 
if buffer pointer is pointing to even device then 
write to even device and to the next odd device 
else write to odd device only; 
end. 
Readd ( 
begin 
acquire a free buffer; 
read from the even device; 
if the even device is unreadable 
read from the next odd device; 
end. 
We have omitted error reporting aspects of the read and 
write routines for the purposes of readability. Both of these 
routines write error reports to say which disks can not be read 
or written. Also, if the write operation to the even numbered 
device was not successful, the write operation to the odd num-
bered device would not be initiated. In such circumstances, 
error reports would be written and crash recovery would be 
invoked. From the program it can be seen that once an even 
numbered device is written the associated odd numbered device 
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will also be written with the same information. If the pointer 
is already pointing to an odd numbered device (this is the case 
with non stable disks, example, swapping devices), only that 
device is written. All disks which do not require crash resis-
tant capability are treated as odd numbered devices. Once such 
a device is written, there is no write operation to a second 
disk. The modifications to the read operation were to enable a 
read action from a second disk when an attempt to read from the 
first disk fails. It also incorporates a more comprehensive 
error reporting capability. 
The actual modification to existing kernel code and the 
addition of new statements constituted less than a page of C 
programming language statements. Basically, we used the rou-
tines which were already available. We substituted existing 
routines whose behaviour had characteristics which we found 
desirable for routines which we did not consider suitable for 
our needs. For example, a write routine which waited for phy-
sical I/O to be completed before returning was substituted for 
write routines which carried out asynchronous I/O and which did 
not wait for the completion of phYSical I/O. In order to incor-
porate the management of replicated disks, modification to 
existing statements was required. However, there is no substan-
tial difference in size between the modified file system and 
the standard UNIX file system. 
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4.3.2. Pile Level: Implementation of Crash Resistant Pile 
Operations 
The previous level implements stable disks as uninter-
preted streams of bytes. The concept of a file is not known on 
that level. The file level implements the UNIX file concepts, 
utilising stable disks. Thus, a crash resistant file system 
would be constructed from a set of ordered pairs of "even, odd" 
disk storage devices numbered «evenl, oddl>, <even2, odd2>, 
... ). The aim of this level is to help ensure that the activi-
ties involved in managing a file system do not introduce data 
inconsistency. The UNIX file location and file accessing 
mechanisms were not modified. The main modifications made on 
this level were to ensure that physical I/O operations on 
behalf of a file are carried out before a return from a write 
system call is made. This is to ensure that a processor crash 
would not distort a users' view of the disk and that such a 
view would be consistent with the actual disk state. This 
level also interfaces file operations to those of a stable disk 
so that all files are automatically replicated on the two disks 
that make up a stable disk. 
4.3.3. Crash Recovery 
It is assumed that both disks that make up a stable disk 
will not be damaged at the same time. The file system 
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therefore ensures that the crash recovery routine is invoked 
more frequently than the estimated mean time between failure 
(MTBF) of an individual disk. Unlike chapter 3, the crash 
resistant file system has error reporting schemes inside the 
kernel so as to enable the crash recovery routine to know which 
disk was being written when a crash occurred. Crash recovery 
here consists of copying one of the disks to the other. The 
preference is to copy the first disk to the second disk so that 
the most recent update can be reflected. If the first disk is 
not readable or was being written when a crash occurred the 
second disk is copied to the first. 
4.4. PERFORMANCE 
Initial tests were carried out so as to gain some insight 
into the performance characteristics of the crash resistant 
file system. Our goal was to measure and compare its perfor-
mance with that of the conventional UNIX file system. Such 
measurements would enable us to know the kind of overhead a 
user incurs when using crash resistant data. Our discussion 
will concentrate on the write operation since that operation is 
most affected by our modifications. Four kinds of experiments 
were carried out. The measurements were again performed on a 
PDP-II/4S machine running V7 UNIX and RL02 disks were used. 
The "time" and "times" facility of UNIX were used to obtain 
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timing measurements. The first two sets of experiments were 
designed to measure the effects on a file system when crash 
resistance facilities are incorporated. They were therefore 
carried out in single-user environments so as to avoid multi-
user interference. The last two sets of experiments attempt to 
measure the same effects but in the face of multi-user interac-
tion. 
4.4.1. Single-User Environments 
The first set of experiments measured the rate at which 
each file system wrote 6k bytes of data from and to user files. 
Several measurements were performed using different block 
sizes. The results of the experiments are shown in figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Data Transfer Rates for Write Operation 
Measurements indicate a minimum transfer rate of about 
eight kilobytes for each of the two file systems. The transfer 
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rate increases as the block size increases. This is because 
less time is spent in making system calls when larger block 
sizes are used than when smaller block sizes are used to write 
the same amount of data. 
The crash resistant file system writes to two disks so a 
50% degradation might be expected. However, effective placement 
of fault tolerance facilities has enabled this to be kept to 
between 10% to 25%. Suppose that we represent the time which 
is spent during a write operation by Wop = Wr + Ov. ("Wr" is 
the time which is spent on actual phYSical write operation and 
"Ov" is the time which is spent on calculating disk space allo-
cations, carrying out required swapping activities, transfer-
ring data from user buffer to system buffer and carrying out 
any other file management activities that are necessary). The 
"Wr" factor is usually small compared with the "Ov" factor. 
Since a crash resistant operation writes to two disks, it could 
be expected that the time spent in carrying out a write opera-
tion would be Wres = 2Wr + 20v. However, our implementation 
avoided a recalculation of disk space allocation and other file 
management activities so that Wres = 2Wr + Ov. A repetition of 
the "Ov" factor which is responsible for most of the overhead 
in a write operation was avoided. Instead the same calculated 
parameters are used to write to both disks thereby resulting in 
a significant reduction in the expected performance 
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degradation. Some performance degradation should in our opin-
ion, be acceptable if high reliability is required. 
A second set of experiments used a task which represents 
an important class of typical UNIX file system activity (such 
as a task with more read than write requests). The speed of 
the file systems was measured by executing this typical UNIX 
task on the benchmarked file systems and measuring the time 
which was used to complete the task for different file sizes. 
Again based on the results of the analysis which were made by 
wyeth [Wyeth73] we chose a task with a 3:1 ratio of read to 
write operations. The results of the measurements were used to 
calculate the slowdown measure of the modified file system by 
Slowdown Measure = 
Time spent by Our System - Time spent by ordinary UNIX 
------------------------------------------------------
Time spent by ordinary UNIX 
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Figure 12: Slowdown Measure for Typical UNIX Task 
As the file Slze increases, the number of I/O operations 
required to access the entire file increases. In such cir-
cumstances, the read operation would usually dominate the I/O 
accesses and the slowdown measure will decrease as can be seen 
in the graph of figure 12. A typical application could thus be 
expected to run with not more than 25% performance degradation 
on the average when the crash resistant UNIX file system is 
used. As would be expected, this implementation has a better 
performance characteristic than the stable storage implementa-
tion of chapter 3. This is because unlike that implementation, 
the management of replicated disks was controlled from within 
the kernel by this implementation. As has already been 
observed, this resulted in the reduction of the nOv" factor. 
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4.4.2. Multi-User Environments 
The tests described so far were carried out for single-
user environments. The results indicate that performance 
degradation is acceptable. It is desirable, however, to know 
the performance of this file system in the presence of multi-
user interactions. The third and fourth set of tests were 
designed for this purpose. 
When users interact, there is the possibility that the 
operating system would carry out asynchronous I/O on behalf of 
the users. The "elapsed" time for user A say, might include the 
time which is spent in carrying out part of user S's request. 
The third set of tests were designed to measure the actual time 
(exclusive of asynchronous I/O times for other processes) spent 
by each file system in writing a specified number of bytes to a 
user file. The "user" and "sys" times, which represent the 
time spent outside and inside the kernel, respectively, on 
behalf of a user process, were measured. Three users were 
allowed to write Sk bytes of data to user files and time meas-
urements were recorded. Figure 13 shows the result of six test 
runs. 
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I User1 II User2 II User3 II Total Time 
1--- --1------11------1------1 1------1------1 1------1------1 
I UNIX ICrash I I UNIX ICrash I I UNIX ICrash II UNIX ICrash I 
I Resistntl Resistntl Resistntl ** Resistnt 
I I II I II I II I ** I 
1------1------11------1------1 1------1------1 1------1------1 
I 0.08 I 0.06 II 0.04 I 0.04 II 0.06 I 0.06 II 0.18 I 0.16 I 
I 0.04 I 0.04 II 0.06 I 0.10 II 0.04 I 0.06 II 0.14 I 0.20 I 
I 0.06 I 0.06 II 0.10 I 0.08 II 0.08 I 0.04 II 0.24 I 0.18 I 
I 0.08 I 0.06 II 0.12 I 0.08 II 0.06 I 0.06 II 0.26 I 0.20 I 
I 0.06 I 0.04 II 0.04 I 0.06 II 0.06 I 0.10 II 0.16 I 0.20 I 
I 0.04 I 0.06 II 0.04 I 0.04 II 0.02 I 0.04 II 0.10 I 0.14 I 
1------1------11------1------1 1------1------1 1------1------1 
Figure 13: Multiple Users Processing Time: Write Operation 
Time measurements given for each user in figure 13 are the 
sum of the "user" and "sys" times. The figures in the starred 
columns are not measured values. They are calculated by sum-
ming the appropriate values in each row. Taking the average of 
the six runs in these figures, it can be seen that the operat-
ing system spends a total of about 0.18 seconds for the three 
users in each of the two file systems. (It is relevant to 
point out that measurements for "user" and "sys" times in UNIX 
are highly approximate.) However, overheads were sufficiently 
small as not to affect these measurements. 
Though the operating systems spent approximately the same 
time for a task in both file systems, the user process in the 
crash resistant file system is blocked until acknowledgement 
from a write operation is received. This is to ensure that the 
effects of a completed operation can not be abrogated by a 
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processor crash. It would be useful to know the kind of delays 
which a user of a crash resistant file system would expect in a 
mUlti-user environment. However, measurements to determine 
process "blocked times" are very unreliable since they depend 
heavily on the load on the computer system at any particular 
time. Elapsed time measurements for file access rates in such 
environments are sometimes difficult to account for. Unlike 
the previous measurements, such measurements would include time 
spent for' other processes in an asynchronous I/O environment. 
Memory contention experienced by the processor and swapping 
activities are some of the determining factors. 
Some experiments were carried out for a three user system. 
Since the results which are obtained from such measurements are 
highly load dependent, figures are not very meaningful. How-
ever, the results show between a 3:1 to 5:1 ratio in UNIX: 
crash resistant file system performance as measured by the 
"elapsed time". This is in contrast to a single user system 
which showed a negligible difference in performance. The use 
of a crash resistant file system in a multi-user environment 
could therefore contribute to a substantial overhead depending 
on the load on a computer system. Some ways of reducing this 
overhead are discussed in the next section. 
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4.5. EXTENSIONS 
Some optimisation to the existing algorithms can be made. 
A desirable refinement would be to help reduce process "blocked 
times" when a crash resistant file system is used in a multi-
user environment. The major cause of the "apparent" (not real 
with respect to overall processor and disk utilisation) perfor-
mance degradation is the requirement that an acknowledgement 
for a write operation must be delayed until physical I/O is 
completed. In transaction-based systems it might not be neces-
sary to ensure the crash resistance of operations until commit 
time. If a crash occurs, only uncommitted updates will be lost 
and this would be acceptable. File operations in such environ-
ments should support fault tolerance facilities for storage 
decays, disk crashes and transient I/O faults but not against 
processor crashes. A "make-cr" (make crash resistant) primitive 
could be provided to be invoked at transaction commit time. 
This primitive would ensure that all outstanding write opera-
tions on behalf of a user process are written to stable storage 
before file operations are committed. There has been a lot of 
work in making transaction based systems reliable. Some 
approaches and strategies for such systems can be found in 
[Eliot83], [Moss81'], [Paxton79]. 
The above approach would only apply in transaction-based 
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environments. In other environments it would be necessary for 
file operations to be resistant to processor crashes since 
there is no transaction or file commit operation. One approach 
which could be appropriate in some circumstances (in both tran-
saction and non-transaction systems) involves the use of two 
processors, say pI and p2, in an implementation of stable 
storage. It is reasonable to assume that these two processors 
are not crash-related. A write operation will write to the two 
processors and asynchronous I/O in 'each processor will be per-
formed as in an ordinary file system. If pI crashes, only buf-
fered data in that machine will be lost, for we assume that p2 
will complete its write operation. A return from either pI or 
p2 is sufficient to ensure crash resistance of the stored data. 
This would eliminate the blocking of user processes which use a 
crash resistant file system in a multi-user environment. This 
approach would be similar to the Tandem[Borr81] approach to the 
provision of reliable storage except that in a Tandem system 
not only disk drives and processors would be replicated but 
also I/O channels, interprocessor buses, power supply units and 
so on in order to provide a non-stop service. 
Another extension concerns the method of crash recovery. 
It would be desirable to implement a more selective crash 
recovery scheme which would avoid recovering the entire disk 
after a crash has occurred. It might be sufficient in many 
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environments to recover only the files that were being written 
when a crash occurred. One approach would require recording 
the identity of the file that is being written so that only 
that file is recovered by the crash recovery routine. However, 
in environments such as ours, where the crash recovery routine 
is invoked at regular intervals for maintenance purposes, it is 
desirable to recover the entire disk during each crash recovery 
operation. This would enable the crash recovery routine to 
check the status of the entire disk as a maintenance action. 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
The UNIX file system has been implemented on stable disks 
so as to provide a crash resistant file system. Unlike the 
implementation of a stable storage system in chapter 3 which 
provided reliable disks for storing user data, this chapter has 
provided reliable disks for storing both user and system infor-
mation. Modifications were made to the kernel to incorporate 
the management of replicated disks. It was also necessary to 
ensure that file management activities (such as the use of 
buffering mechanisms~ do not introduce data inconsistency into 
the file system. This necessitated limited modifications to the 
UNIX file system code. Our approach has made it possible to 
make both user data and system file management information 
(such as i-nodes in UNIX) crash resistant. This has resulted in 
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a UNIX file system which contains sufficient redundancy to 
enable easy recovery from transient hardware malfunctions, 
decay of storage media and processor crashes. 
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5. CRASH-RESISTANT, REPLICATED and STABLE S'l'ORAGE 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
A reliable data storage system is expected both to safe-
guard the data that is entrusted to it and also to ensure that 
data objects are accessible in spite of the occurrence of 
failures. In a centralised system, it might be sufficient 
(with respect to accessibility of data) to record the value of 
an entity only once. In a distributed system, data entities 
can be made more readily acceSSible by replicating them on dif-
ferent machines so as to keep them nearer to where they are 
being used. Replication also enables many nodes to service 
requests for the same information in parallel. However, one of 
the main reasons for replicating data in a distributed system 
is to provide resiliency with respect to node and network 
failures. Failure of the machine storing the only copy (or 
copies) of some data will prevent the completion of any task 
which needs that data. In a distributed environment this could 
prevent the completion of a distributed task even though many 
of its sub-tasks running on other machines have been success-
fully completed. The provision of replicas on different 
machines means that any task (whether or not distributed) which 
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needs the replicated data has a chance to proceed as long as 
there is a copy on a working node. 
The previous chapters used the duplication of data within 
the same processor to help provide fault tolerance capabilities 
in the face of various disk and processor failures. This 
chapter uses the replication of data on different machines in a 
distributed system to increase the availability of stored data 
despite the failure of the communication network. Here we are 
concerned only with faults which occur in a distributed system 
due to the replication of data on different machines. In par-
ticular, we aim at ensuring that such replication of data does 
not result in the mutual inconsistency of data when the network 
partitions. 
This chapter in fact describes the final stage in our data 
storage construction. It describes the construction of what we 
call CRES (Crash-resistant, Replicated and Stable) storage. 
This combines the use of data replication with the fault toler-
ance capabilities provided by the stable storage mechanism and 
the crash resistant file system of chapter 4 to produce a data 
storage system which is resilient to many of the faults which 
affect disk storage devices as well as to processor crashes and 
network failures. Such storage provides a higher degree of data 
reliability and availability than conventional data storage 
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systems. 
CRES storage replicates the crash resistant files which 
are implemented by the previous chapters on different machines 
in a distributed system. Our model of CRES storage is a col-
lection of logical files. Each logical file F, is made up of 
multiple crash resistant files located on different computers 
such that F = (fl, f2, ... , fm} where each fi is a crash resis-
tant file on computer i. Each crash resistant file fi is in 
turn represented by a set of stable objects which reside on 
stable disks associated with computer i. (Recall that a stable 
object is an atomic entity that reliably stores data and with 
the attribute that any update operation on it either occurs 
completely or not at all.) 
The use of multiple copies of data requires that mutual 
consistency of the copies be maintained. A user should not be 
allowed to access a resource which is in an inconsistent state. 
However, network partitioning could interfere with the mainte-
nance of such consistency. Network partitioning occurs when a 
distributed system is divided into subsystems such that the 
sites in the different subsystems cannot communicate. This is 
usually brought about by a failure of the communications net-
work. The non communicating subsystems are referred to as par-
titions. Many solutions have been proposed for maintaining the 
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mutual consistency of resources [Alsberg76], [Ellis77], [Tho-
mas78], [Stonebraker79], [Gifford79], [Eager,83]. However, 
these have not directly addressed the problem of resolving 
inconsistencies that can arise among replicated resources after 
a network had been partitioned. One drastic "solution" to the 
inconsistency problem resulting from network partitioning is to 
cease all operations in the distributed system until the net-
work is fully reconnected. Another conventional solution is to 
allow processing to continue only in one partition. It is 
often desirable though, to keep individual sites or partitions 
operational when a distributed data storage system partitions. 
Such autonomous operation by various partitions could clearly 
result in mutual inconsistency among multiple copies of 
resources. It is therefore necessary that when the network 
reconnects, individual partitions should compare their update 
operations, detect conflicts and resolve them before partitions 
are allowed to merge. 
This chapter presents an algorithm which addresses some of 
these issues. We address the problem of detecting and resolv-
ing mutual inconsistency among replicated data entities before 
the merge of a partitioned data storage system. It is usually 
accepted that automatic resolution of mutual inconsistency 
among replicated entities is not generally possible except when 
the semantics of operations on the entities are known a priori 
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[Walker83], [Brereton83], [Wright83]. These algorithms require 
a declaration of the readset and writeset of a task. (Recall 
that the readset and writeset of a task refer to those data 
objects which a task reads from or writes to.) 
In contrast our algorithm combines conflict detection and 
resolution in such a way as to allow automatic conflict resolu-
tion without requiring that the readset and writeset of an 
application be declared beforehand. Another desirable property 
is that the update operations which have already been applied 
to a majority of the replicates are not undone when a conflict 
is detected. 
Before going into the details of our proposal for a parti-
tioned update and merge algorithm, it may be helpful to present 
in the next section a brief survey of previous work on replica-
tion and network partitioning. Section 5.3 presents our pro-
posed algorithm for the update and merge of a partitioned data 
storage system. Section 5.4 considers the implementation of the 
proposed algorithm in a UNIX United system. It discusses a 
method for achieving replication transparency as well as the 
creation, reading and writing of replicated files in such an 
environment. Section 5.5 considers the performance charac-
teristics of the proposed algorithm. In section 5.6 we present 
an extension to the merge algorithm. Section 5.7 gives some 
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concluding remarks. 
5.2. PREVIOUS WORK 
This section gives a brief survey of replication and net-
work partitioning algorithms. These algorithms can be classi-
fied as those requiring (1) weak consistency and (2) strong 
consistency. 
5.2.1. Weak Consistency Algorithms 
Weak consistency algorithms do not require that all copies 
of a replicated data item contain the same information at all 
times. Instead, the requirement is that all replicas contain 
the same values when update operations on a data item cease. 
In these algorithms update operations on replicas are performed 
in isolation (without consulting other replicas). The update 
requests are sent to other nodes with the hope that eventually 
all nodes will receive and carry out these update operations. 
Weak consistency algorithms depend on a highly reliable network 
which is expected to deliver all messages. 
Arguments in support of maintaining only weak consistency 
are based on the need for increased availability. These algo-
rithms are usually designed for such applications as mail sys-
tems and name servers which do not require strong consistency. 
(For example, take a simplified mail service which allows 
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clients to add mail messages only at the end of the mail-box. 
Various copies of the mail-box may at times contain different 
messages as long as all copies of the mail-box contain the same 
set of messages when update operations on the mail-box ceases.) 
The degree of inconsistency allowed would depend on the appli-
cation requirements. Weak consistency algorithms allow pro-
cessing while a network is partitioned, but these algorithms 
are only suitable for a limited set of applications. 
5.2.2. Strong Consistency Algorithms 
Many algorithms which insist on strong consistency require 
that all copies or a majority 
before update operations can be 
[Ellis77], [Thomas78], [Mullery75]. 
of the copies be accessible 
performed on a data item 
When a network partitions, there are three processing pos-
sibilities (i) no part of the system can continue proceSSing, 
(ii) only one part of the system can continue processing or 
(iii) two or more parts of the system can continue processing. 
Voting schemes are often used to determine whether or not pro-
cessing (particularly update operations) can be carried out. 
There are however other algorithms such as control token algo-
rithms [Alsberg76], [LeLann78], [Minoura82] which do not use 
voting solutions but instead insist that a primary site must be 
contacted before update operations can be performed. 
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Voting Schemes and Primary Site Algorithms 
In voting solutions, update operations are carried out 
only if all sites that store replicas have agreed to carry out 
the update operations. In this approach, mutual consistency of 
replicas is maintained by having all sites perform the same 
update operations in parallel. Usually, an initiating site 
broadcasts update requests to all sites. A "reject" or "accept" 
acknowledgement is returned from each site. Having received 
votes from all site, the initiating site broadcasts an "update" 
or "abort" message to all sites depending on the outcome of the 
voting. Sites have some criteria for accepting or rejecting an 
update request. A two phase commit [Gray78], [Lampson79] or 
similar protocol is used to obtain agreement among sites which 
store replicas. 
The majority consensus algorithm[Thomas78] requires only 
that a majority of the sites return "accept" acknowledgements. 
The weighted voting scheme described by Gifford[Gifford79] pro-
vides a biased method of election in favour of application 
requirements. In that scheme, the democratic "one man, one 
vote" election criterion is not strictly adhered to. Replicas 
are assigned votes based on reliability, performance and avai-
lability requirements. If reliability is required for instance, 
replicas on reliable nodes are assigned more votes so that a 
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consensus (permission to write to a replicated file) is 
obtained when such nodes vote. 
Voting schemes which require that all replicas be accessi-
ble before an update operation can be carried out will of 
course be unable to access all replicas when a network parti-
tions. Consequently, no replica will be updated. Majority con-
sensus and weighted voting algorithms seem better suited for 
network partitioning since they do not demand that all replicas 
be accessible. It could therefore be possible at least for one 
partition to continue processing. However, a network could 
still partition in such a way that obtaining a majority con-
sensus will not be possible. 
Primary site algorithms do not seek consensus among repli-
cas but require that a primary site be contacted before update 
operations can be performed. Various algorithms are used to 
determine a primary site. Control token algorithms allocate a 
control privilege temporarily to one site which then acts as 
the primary site. Other algorithms induce a total ordering of 
sites and then take the site with the highest sequence number 
as the primary site. In these algorithms, network partitioning 
might make the primary site inaccessible. However, the parti-
tion containing the primary site (possibly consisting of the 
primary site alone) will always be able to continue processing. 
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The major pitfall of the primary site approach is that it 
unduly restricts processing during both normal and partitioned 
processing since the accessibility of replicated data depends 
on a particular node being accessible. 
5.2.3. Conflict Detection and Resolution Algorithms 
The strong conSistency algorithms are not resilient to 
network partitioning. By this we mean that they do not allow 
s'eparated parts of a system to carry out autonomous processing 
on replicates when a network partitions. They do not, there-
fore, need to provide schemes for resolving the mutual incon-
sistency among replicates which could result from such parti-
tioned operations. 
In many circumstances a desirable solution is to allow 
autonomous operations in the various partitions and then detect 
and resolve conflicts when two or more partitions are merged. 
Algorithms for detecting mutual inconsistency among replicated 
objects are presented in [Parker83], [Brereton83]. However, 
these discuss resolution of inconsistency only for special file 
types such as directories and mail-boxes for which the seman-
tics of operations are simple and, more importantly, known. 
Conflict resolution algorithms are similar to optimistic con-
currency strategies [Kung82] since they do not try to mask or 
prevent faults from occurring but instead aim at resolving the 
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conflicts which may arise. 
A merge algorithm is presented in[Wright83CL •••. ]. This 
algorithm is based on obtaining a global serial schedule of the 
combined set of transactions from all partitions. Each parti-
tion maintains a record of the order in which transactions in 
that partition are committed. A history of the readsets and 
writesets of transactions in each partition are also kept using 
some appropriate scheme. A survey of techniques for storing 
update histories and recovery data can be found 
in[Verhofstad78]. When a network reconnects, each partition 
derives a serial schedule of all transactions which have com-
mitted in that partition since the partition was formed. These 
individual serial schedules are used to obtain a global serial 
schedule by backing out a subset of transactions. This algo-
rithm, which uses a graph-theoretic approach, guarantees that 
it can be determined in polynomial time which transactions must 
be backed out so as to keep the combined set of transactions 
serializable. One approach to determining the order of tran-
sactions in a network would require a reasonable amount of syn-
chronisation among clocks in the individual sites. (Clock 
synchronisation [Lamport78] in a distributed system is in itself 
a difficult problem.) 
Another merge algorithm is described by Wright[Wright83]. 
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This algorithm does not consider the problem of detecting 
inconsistencies. However assuming that inconsistencies can be 
detected, the method requires that the activities of an appli-
cation program be grouped a priori into transaction classes. It 
might not always be possible to determine beforehand all the 
resource requirements of an application so as to group applica-
tion programs into classes. Consider database applications 
where records to be read or written might depend on the value 
of fields in other database records. It would be difficult to 
know beforehand the complete set of resources which such an 
application program requires. In such circumstances, it might 
be necessary to declare the entire database as the readset and 
writeset of the application program. 
A more desirable solution is to allow application programs 
to acquire necessary resources as the need arises. Our proposed 
algorithm (which is discussed in the next section) permits 
autonomous operations in the various partitions of a network 
and dynamically determines the writeset of an application pro-
gram. It also provides a merge scheme for the general object 
type as opposed to a scheme for special file types whose opera-
tion semantics are known. 
5.3. PARTITIONED PROCESSING 
The following discussion applies only to replicated files. 
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For non-replicated files, the update and merge protocols are 
not invoked since partitioned processing is invoked only for 
replicated files. Our system differentiates between replicated 
and non-replicated files. A technique for detecting replication 
and keeping it transparent to the user is discussed later in 
this chapter. 
A set of sites which are in communication with each other 
constitute a partition. It might be helpful to think of a par-
tition as a single logical node consisting of a set of communi-
cating nodes. The universal node unode(f) for a file f will be 
used to refer to the set of all sites in a distributed system 
which store copies of the file f. The majority partition 
Majp(f) for a file f will refer to the sites which store copies 
of f and which are in communication with a majority (absolute 
majority) of the sites in unode(f). Any partition which is not 
the majority partition will be referred to as a minority parti-
tion Minp(f). (The concept of majority partition is file depen-
dent. A partition is a majority partition with respect to a 
specific file or a set of files.) 
5.3.1. A Partitioned Update Algorithm 
The algorithm presented here allows update activities in 
all partitions when a network partitions. However, only the 
update operations of the partition which has a majority of file 
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replicates (majority partition) are reflected in the actual 
file copy. The update operations of a minority partition are 
delayed so as to be incorporated into the actual file copy 
after that partition has rejoined the majority partition. (The 
actual file copy refers to the file copy which is stored by 
each site in the majority partition.) We assume the existence 
of a mechanism for obtaining majority consensus. The use of a 
majority updating scheme ensures mutual consistency between the 
majority of the copies of a file (namely, those copies which 
are stored by the majority partition). It also ensures that 
the update operations which have been applied to the majority 
of the file copies are not undone during a merge operation 
since only the operations of the minority partition are undone. 
The merge algorithm is discussed in the next section. In order 
to allow minority updating and to be able to resolve conflicts 
which might arise, we use the following data structures: 
An entity list is an ordered set of integers (El, E2, ... , 
Em). It contains the identification numbers of all objects 
which are modified by a partition since the partition was 
formed. This data structure is maintained by every node in a 
partition. 
A stable update set is a collection of records where each 
record contains the following: 
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N: node identifier 
f: file identifier 
ob: object number 
u: update request = (read, write) 
d: data to be written 
An update set is similar to an intentions list 
in[Lampson79] except that instead of identifying a transaction, 
it identifies a node which is involved in an update operation. 
We shall make the following assumptions about the activities of 
a minority partition: 
ASl: The update operations of a minority partition are 
assumed to be initiated at the time when that par-
tition rejoins the majority. 
AS2: Objects which are updated by a minority partition 
are not accessible to users until after that par-
tition has merged with the majority partition. All 
access requests for such objects fail giving 
appropriate error reports. 
Each site can determine whether it is part of a majority 
or minority partition by executing a majority consensus algo-
rithm. The details of how this is carried out will be discussed 
later when considering implementation issues. The algorithm 
for updating objects is as follows: Each site in a minority 
partition maintains a stable update set for each file which it 
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desires to update and stores its update requests in that set. 
A stable update set serves as an audit trail which is used to 
record requested operations on objects by nodes in a minority 
partition. This allows a file to be left in the state it was in 
when the partitioning occurred, and enabling subsequent update 
requests to be carried out later during a merge operation as 
long as no conflict is detected. It is possible to allow local 
processes to make use of (locally) updated values by making the 
contents of the stable update set accessible to local 
processes. It would then be necessary to address the problem of 
results being allowed to leave the computer system from a 
minority partition. Our present algorithm does not address this 
issue. 
Sites in the majority partition apply their update opera-
tions to their local file copies after an agreement to perform 
the update operations has been obtained from every site in the 
majority partition. This is not difficult since sites in the 
majority partition are in communication with each other. If 
agreement is not obtained, the update request is rejected. 
Each partition maintains an entity list and records in it the 
identification numbers of objects that are modified in that 
partition. The use of an entity list enables the update and 
merge protocol to determine dynamically the update class of 
each partition and thus enable easy conflict detection. It is 
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not necessary that a task declares its update class a priori 
(as in[Wright83] for example). Conflict detection is carried 
out when a site in the minority partition requests a merge. 
The next section discusses how a merge operation is initiated 
and carried out. 
5.3.2. A Network Merge Algorithm 
When a site in a minority partition determines (by execut-
ing a majority consensus algorithm) that it has resumed commun-
ication with the majority partition, it initiates a merge 
operation by sending a merge request to all sites. The major-
ity consensus scheme which is applied to update requests by the 
majority partition is used to process a merge request. A merge 
request is accepted either conditionally or unconditionally. 
Unconditional acceptance is given when the update classes of 
the majority and minority partitions do not conflict; otherwise 
a conditional acceptance is given. In order that the opera-
tions of the two partitions may be considered conflict-free, it 
is usually required that the invariant 
INV: Wil\ Rj 
hold (Here i and j are the majority and minority partitions 
respectively; Ri and Wi are the readset and writeset of parti-
tion i). However, because of assumptions ASl and AS2, the 
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activities of the minority partition cannot influence the data 
which is read by the majority partition. We can therefore 
remove the first two requirements of the invariant INV and 
require only that Wil\Wj = 0 holds. The activities of two par-
titions can therefore be considered to conflict if their asso-
ciated entity lists have one or more entries in common. If no 
conflict is detected, and the merge request is unconditionally 
accepted, the stable update set of the minority partition would 
be applied to the majority partition file copy and the entity 
list of the minority partition would be added to that of the 
majority partition. Conditional acceptance of a merge request 
requires that the affected minority partition discards its 
update set and entity list before rejoining the majority parti-
tion. After a successful merge operation, a minority partition 
initialises its file copy and entity list from the (merged) 
file copy and entity list of the majority partition. This 
algorithm is applied independently for each file which is modi-
fied by a minority partition. 
Figure 14 gives an example of what happens during a merge 
operation in the case of a file f which is replicated on five 
machines Ul, U2, U3, U4 and us. 
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Unode(f) [Ul,U2,U3,U4,US] 
/ \ 
/ \ 
,j. .. 
Minp(f) [U3,US] Majp(f) [Ul,U2,U4] 
(EL = El) (EL = E3,E14,E20,E22) 
/ \ 
/ \ 
~ ~ 
Minp(f) [U3] Minp(f) [US] 
(EL = El,E14) (EL = El,E6,Ell) 
-I '4 
••• to Majp(f) [Ul,U2,U4,US] 
(EL = El,E3,E6,Ell,E14,E20,E22) 
Figure 14: Merge Graph 
In figure 14, the universal node Unode(f} consists of the 
five nodes which store copies of the file f. The entity list 
"EL" is used to record the identification numbers of updated 
objects in a partition. Stable update sets are used to store 
the update requests and data which is associated with such 
requests. Sub-partitions inherit the entity lists and stable 
update sets of their parent partition. An entity list for a 
partition would be empty only if no update operations were car-
ried out in that partition. Each partition can determine 
whether or not it is part of a majority partition by executing 
a majority consensus algorithm. From figure 14, it can be seen 
that the minority partitions Minp(f) [U3, US], Minp(f)[U3] and 
Minp(f)[US] each carried out update operations since their 
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entity lists are not empty. It can also be seen that the 
update operation carried out by Minp(f) [U3, US] on object 1 as 
reflected in "El" was inherited by the sub-partitions 
Minp(f)[U3] and Minp(f)[US]. 
Suppose now that the minority partition Minp(f) [US] 
requests a merge with the majority partition Majp(f)[Ul, U2, 
U4]. The entity lists of the two partitions will be compared. 
From figure 14 it can be seen that these two entity lists have 
no entry in common which means that there is no conflict 
between the update operations of those two partitions. The 
merge request will therefore be accepted unconditionally. The 
contents of the stable update set of the minority partition 
Minp(f)[US] will be applied to the majority file copy and sites 
which were in Minp(f) [US] will reinitialise their entity lists 
from that of the majority partition's (merged) entity list. 
Now consider a merge request by the minority partition 
Minp(f) [U3] with the Majp(f)[Ul, U2, U4]. The entity lists of 
this partition and that of the majority partition have an entry 
in common namely, "El4". This means that a conflict exists. A 
conditional acceptance to the merge request will be given. 
Minp(f) [U3] will be required to discard its update set before 
rejoining the majority partition. It will also reinitialise its 
entity list from the entity list of the majority partition. 
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Notice that the majority partition does not maintain a stable 
update set, since its operations are applied directly on the 
majority file copy and such operations are not undone during a 
merge operation. An extension to the merge algorithm presented 
here which allows the merging of minority partitions is given 
in section 5.6 
5.4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
This section considers the implementation of the proposed 
algorithm in a UNIX United distributed system. The architecture 
of a UNIX United system has been described in chapter 3. The 
replication layer can be conveniently placed between the user 
and the Newcastle Connection software as portrayed in Figure 
15. 
----------------------------
1 User 
1-------------------------
1 Replication Layer 
1--------------------------
. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 Newcastle Connection 1 
1----------------------------1 
1 Kernel 1 
Figure 15: Position of the Replication Layer 
The aim is to support file replication facilities while 
maintaining the standard UNIX system interface. This is 
achieved by making replication transparent to the user so that 
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a replicated file can be accessed and updated with the same 
system calls as an ordinary UNIX file. However, the creation of 
a replicated file is not transparent to the user since we 
believe that a user should be aware of the fact that he is 
creating a replicated file. A new system call is provided by 
this algorithm for the creation of replicated files. (An alter-
native would be, as with stable files, to provide directories 
within which all files are automatically replicated.) 
5.4.1. File Creation and Placement 
To create replicated files a user would invoke a "mkrep" 
primitive. These files are created as special objects. The 
"mkrep" primitive marks these files to ensure that they are 
detectable as replicated objects. Each site has an ordered set 
of sites (related sites) on which it stores its file copies. 
The "mkrep" primitive takes an argument which indicates the 
number of replicas required. It creates a "first" file copy on 
its node and replicas on related nodes until the required 
number of replicas have been created. Entries are made in an RN 
(related node) table stored at each node to record the identity 
of nodes where a site stores replicas. Each entry in the RN 
table consists of an ordered set of node names which indicate 
the order in which related nodes should be contacted. The first 
entry in each table is referred to as the first related node, 
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the second as the second related node and so on. 
Ul: (U2) 
U2: (Ul, U3, U4) 
U3: (U2, U4) 
Figure 16: RN (related node) Table 
Figure 16 shows that computer U1 stores its file copies in 
computer U2. Computer U2 stores file copies in computers U1, U3 
and U4. Computer U3 stores its file copies on computers U2 and 
U4. Each computer maintains a separate replication directory 
"REP" on behalf of each node for which it stores file copies. 
These file copies are stored in the respective "REP" directory. 
Looking at figure 16, since computer U2 stores file replicates 
on behalf of computer U1 and U3, computer U2 will maintain 
directories "REP1" and "REP3" which will contain file repli-
cates from U1 and U3 respectively. 
5.4.2. File Access 
File access is the same for replicated files as for ordi-
nary UNIX files. A user calls the operations of the replica-
tion layer in order to open, read and write files. Replication 
is made transparent to the user. The replication layer inter-
cepts all system calls so as to detect access requests to 
replicated files. This layer is also responsible for obtaining 
majority consensus. In accessing a file which is replicated on 
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N machines, this layer would map the user's single access 
request into N requests (to all copies) in the case of a write 
request and one request (to any accessible copy belonging to 
the majority partition) in the case of a read request. We 
assume the existence of a facility to enable a site to execute 
a majority consensus algorithm by sending messages to all nodes 
in order that it can determine whether or not it is part of a 
majority partition. The number of acknowledgements received in 
response to such messages would enable a site to determine 
whether it is in communication with the majority of the sites 
in the network. When this has been determined, the replication 
layer then issues requests to all sites in the partition to 
write to their local file copy or stable update set depending 
on whether or not a site belongs to the majority or minority 
partition respectively. A read request is first directed to 
the local file copy, if a copy is available at the user's node 
otherwise it is directed to the "first" file copy. If this is 
not successful, the related nodes are searched for replicas 
starting with the first related node. Whether a site seeks 
majority consensus for each separate access or at periodic 
intervals would depend on the consistency requirements of the 
application. If an application seeks majority consensus period-
ically, it has to assume that it is part of a minority parti-
tion until such consensus is sought and obtained. 
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Our'file access strategy requires that if for any reason 
(network partitioning or node failure) the "first" file copy 
is not accessible, the replication layer is to search the RN 
table to determine where the file is replicated. The replica-
tion layer then tries to access the file replica in the first 
related node of the RN table. This is continued until a replica 
is accessed or all related nodes have been tried. If the file 
is not a replicated file, all file access requests to related 
nodes would fail, otherwise a replica will be accessed. The 
replication layer makes file copies belonging to minority par-
titions inaccessible to remote nodes. All requests for such 
files fail giving appropriate error reports. The replication 
layer passes all accesses to remote nodes to the Newcastle Con-
nection software which handles remote accesses in a UNIX United 
system. 
5.4.3. Replication Transparency 
There are various methods which can be used to obtain 
replication transparency. One approach would be to use a cen-
tralised name resolution scheme for replicated files. In such a 
scheme, a particular site would be consulted for resolution of 
name references for the entire network or for a subset of the 
nodes in the network. It would then be possible to determine 
that a file is replicated by consulting such a node and to make 
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such name resolution transparent to the user. The use of a 
current synchronization site[Walker83] and the total resource 
directory[Lunn82] are examples of such schemes. This approach 
introduces a centralised source of unreliability because of the 
potential failure of such a vital node. 
A preferable solution would be the implementation of a 
distributed name resolution scheme. Such a scheme will be 
capable of using information which is locally available to 
determine that a file is replicated and will be able to give 
information on its related nodes. One approach would be to tag 
pathnames to files so that replication can always be detected 
by inspecting the pathname to a file. Implementing such a 
scheme in a hierarchical system requires storing not only file 
names but also the contexts in which those names appear. The 
existence of a hierarchical structure imposes a context rela-
tive naming scheme. Consequently, names do not make sense 
except when interpreted within a context. In a hierarchical 
files tore implemented by a network of computer systems, there 
are numerous pathnames to a file depending on where a name 
reference starts. It would therefore be prohibitive in terms 
of storage space requirements to store all possible pathnames 
to a file. 
However, these problems can be avoided by tagging files at 
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creation time. Since the "mkrep" primitive creates a repli-
cated file as a special object, the replication layer sees such 
a file as one requiring special processing. Further investiga-
tion into the "specialness" of such a file can reveal that the 
file is a replicated file and not a "special file" in UNIX 
terms. (Special files in UNIX are usually associated with dev-
ices.) When it has been determined that a file is replicated, 
the file access strategy which was described in the last sec-
tion would then be invoked. 
The replication layer intercepts all system calls and can 
therefore control the contents of the information which a user 
sees. This layer ensures that a user sees a replicated file as 
an ordinary UNIX file. Replication transparency could thus be 
achieved without modifying the UNIX kernel. 
5.4.4. Data Structure Implementation 
The two main data structures which are used by this algo-
rithm have a straightforward implementation in UNIX as crash 
resistant files. A stable update set can be implemented as a 
sequence of 512 byte blocks within a file, where each block 
constitutes an object. Each disk block would contain the "N", " 
fit, "ob" and "u" parameters which identify the node and file to 
which a block of data belongs. A sufficient number of disk 
blocks within a file would be used to store the data which is 
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contained in the "d" parameter. The entity matrix can be 
implemented as a file of integers. 
5.5. PERFORMANCE 
In order to estimate the overhead incurred when this algo-
rithm is used, let us define a few parameters: 
(i) There are n file replicates for each file in the 
data storage system. 
(ii) The time required to write a local copy is w 
(iii) The time required to read a local copy is r. 
(iv) Let e represent the delay in searching for a 
replica in one node. The delay in searching for an 
accessible replica when a copy is not available 
locally is d < ne. 
(v) The time required for obtaining majority consensus 
is c. 
We assume that computing times and times for making remote 
procedure calls are negligible. Storage overheads are also 
negligible since update sets are discarded after successful 
merge operations and therefore do not become very large. In 
order to avoid having large entity lists, all entity lists can 
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be initialised to empty when a merge operation results in 
Majp(f) = Unode(f). (That is when the network is fully recon-
nected and all nodes are in communication with each other. In 
such a situation, it would not be necessary to maintain entity 
lists.) The overhead in reading and writing replicated files 
would be: 
Read-overhead d + c 
Write-overhead (n - l)w + c 
The "d" parameter may be negligible if a copy is available 
locally or if the first related node is accessible. The "w" 
parameter may be small since all accessible nodes will carry 
out their update operations on an object in parallel, each on 
its local copy. The major overhead might be in getting majority 
consensus or the use of agreement protocol in order to obtain 
consensus from replicas on the course of action to be taken 
during an update operation. If a particular implementation 
decides to seek majority consensus periodically rather than for 
each update operation, the "c" overhead would be reduced. 
However, we believe that in appropriate circumstances the 
enhancement in reliability obtained by replicating resources 
could outweigh these performance costs. Suppose that each of 
the replicates has a probability p of being accessible. A sys-
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tern consisting of n replicates would have 
s = 1 - (1 - p)**n 
probability of being accessible. As n increases, the probabil-
ity of such a system being accessible approaches 1 thereby pro-
viding a very high degree of data availability. However, if 
network partitioning and update conflicts are frequent the pro-
bability "p" of accessing a replica will be small. 
5.6. AN EXTENSION 
The only merge operation allowed by the merge algorithm 
presented in this chapter is a merge between a majority and a 
minority partition. However, a network could partition in such 
a way that there would be no majority partition though one 
could come into existence again through the merging of minority 
parti tions. An extension to this algorithm which would allow 
the merge of minority partitions is generally not difficult. 
One approach would be to merge minority partitions by com-
bining their stable update sets and entity lists so that each 
site in the merged partitions contains the same information in 
these two data structures. This will be done after the entity 
lists of the two minority partitions have been compared so as 
to ensure that there is no conflict between the operations of 
the two partitions. If a conflict is detected, the operations 
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of the partition which carried out the least number of update 
operations will be backed out by discarding its update set. 
The partition which was backed out would then initialise its 
entity list and stable update set from those of the partition 
with which it has been merged. Then a majority consensus algo-
rithm would be executed to determine if the newly merged parti-
tion has formed a majority partition. Each site knows the 
number of sites in Unode(f) so it is easy to determine if a 
partition constitutes the majority partition. If the newly 
merged partition contains a majority of the nodes in Unode(f) 
then that partition constitutes the majority partition, in 
which case its update set would be applied to the local file 
copy of each site in that partition. The update set would then 
be discarded since majority partitions do not maintain stable 
update sets. On the other hand if the newly merged partition 
does not form a majority partition, it would remain as a minor-
ity partition and would continue to follow minority processing 
procedures. There can not be more than one majority partition 
in a network at the same time since any site which is in com-
munication with a site in the majority partition is itself part 
of that partition. 
5.7 • CONCLUSION 
The problem of maintaining the consistency of data in a 
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distributed data storage system which supports replicated 
resources has been considered. An algorithm for detecting and 
resolving mutual inconsistencies among replicates in the pres-
ence of network partitioning was presented. The algorithm pro-
vides a merge scheme for the general object type instead of for 
special types of objects whose operation semantics are known. 
Implementation of this algorithm in a UNIX based distributed 
system was discussed (although unlike the techniques of 
chapters 3 and 4 this algorithm has not been implemented). 'The 
algorithm also discusses a simple method of implementing repli-
cation transparency in a distributed hierarchical file store. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
6.1. SUMMARY 
We have considered the general problem of constructing 
robust data storage in a distributed computer system. Our 
approach to the construction of such a system involves provid-
ing reliable storage of data and also ensuring that data 
objects are made accessible in spite of the existence of node 
and network failures. In particular we investigated the 
integration of the stable storage mechanism with data replica-
tion on different computers as a basis for the construction of 
reliable distributed file storage systems. 
The investigation was carried out in the environment pro-
vided by UNIX United which is a UNIX based distributed system 
implementing a global hierarchical file store. Such a system 
was considered highly appropriate for the construction of reli-
able file systems because of the convenient features which it 
provides such as expandability and distribution transparency. 
A survey of the causes of data inconsistency and tech-
niques for maintaining data consistency in distributed systems 
has been discussed. The design and implementation of a stable 
storage system was presented. This system implemented stable 
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disks which provide fault tolerance facilities for faults which 
affect disk storage devices, such as decay of the storage 
medium, transient I/O faults and some effects of processor 
crashes. 
An implementation of a crash resistant UNIX file system 
which is based on the use of the stable storage mechanism has 
been described. Performance evaluation of the stable storage 
system and the crash resistant Unix file system has also been 
carried out. Replication of resources can be an aid to both 
performance and reliability in distributed file store deSign. 
An algorithm for detecting conflicts among replicated objects 
and a merge protocol for a partitioned data storage system was 
presented. Implementation of these algorithms in a UNIX United 
system was discussed. 
6.2. AREAS FOR FUTURE WORK 
Some extensions to the presented algorithms have already 
been mentioned in the individual chapters. This section 
highlights some of these extensions and makes further sugges-
tions as to areas where more work could be useful. 
Obviously it would be desirable to carry the ideas 
presented in chapter 5 on network partitioning through to 
implementation so that the actual overheads and efficiency of 
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the scheme, could be assessed. This will however require access 
to quite a large distributed system. 
Another interesting area for investigation would be the 
provision of user-level (application dependent) fault tolerance 
facilities on top of the facilities which we have provided. The 
main aim would be to ensure that, if all automatic fault toler-
ance facilities fail, an end-user who knows the semantics of 
the application should be given control before extensive "UNDO" 
operations are initiated. Such a user would be in a position to 
(i) accept all the results of processing as produced, 
(ii) or accept only part of the results, 
(iii) or reject all results and calIon the computer 
system to initiate "UNDO" processing. 
It would of course be even more desirable to have a full and 
preferably rigorous specification of an application's require-
ments, so that the computing system can make decisions (i), 
(ii) and (iii) above automatically. 
Another area which requires further investigation is the 
use of forward error recovery techniques for the resolution of 
inconsistency between replicated objects in a distributed sys-
tem. Most existing schemes use backout strategies for conflict 
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resolution. Using forward error recovery would again require a 
knowledge of the semantics of the application so that conflicts 
could be resolved appropriately. A mechanism which is suffi-
ciently general to support 
recovery strategies would be 
both forward and backward error 
highly desirable. Interesting 
discussions on the general use of forward error recovery in 
computer systems can be found in [Cristian82], [CampbeI183]. 
We have already mentioned the need to provide robustness 
of file systems in the presence of buffering. To solve this 
problem we had suggested as an extension to our algorithms the 
use of two processors instead of one in the implementation of 
stable storage systems. We could generalise this extension 
further so as to be able to tolerate a bounded number of pro-
cessor crashes by the use of a specified number of processors. 
An efficient solution which uses this technique and whose cost 
can be justified would also be of interest. However such an 
extension would be taking us toward the situation where one 
could be using N-modular redundancy techniques, based on redun-
dancy at the level of complete computer systems. Thus it would 
be necessary to investigate the relative merits of the two 
approaches. 
The provision of robust processes can be considered to be 
a possible step forward after the provision of stable storage 
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facilities. Such robust processes would be resilient to proces-
sor crashes. These processes would store their states in stable 
storage so as to be restarted from the saved state after a pro-
cessor crash or service interruption. This idea has already 
been suggested in[Lampson79]. A specific way of looking at the 
implementation of such a scheme is as follows: 
An operating system creates processes which carry out work 
on behalf of the computer system and the user. We shall con-
sider these processes to be part of the processor state. The 
processes which are part of (owned by) the current processor 
state we will refer to as "own" processes. Processes whose 
states have been saved in stable storage, and which need to be 
restarted, would have to be considered "adopted" processes 
since they do not belong to the current processor state but 
instead belong to a previous (crashed) processor state. The 
problem then is to integrate these adopted processes into the 
current processor state. 
In summary, we have investigated various related 
approaches to achieving high reliability and availability based 
mainly on the extensive use of storage replication. It would be 
very useful to have some means of estimating the relative costs 
and benefits of these and other approaches for a given type of 
environment and use, so as to be able to choose an optimum sys-
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tem design in each case. This however would be a major 
research project in its own right. 
6.3. ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONCLUSION 
Previous work on stable storage systems provided atomic 
fixed size pages for storing data. This thesis investigated the 
design and construction of a more flexible stable storage sys-
tem which provides atomicity for more complex data structures 
instead of the usual fixed size pages. An algorithm for pro-
viding such a facility has been presented and implemented and 
its performance reported on. 
The thesis has also demonstrated how the stable storage 
mechanism can be interfaced with an existing file system and 
how such a file system can be made crash resistant. This 
required constrained modifications to an existing operating 
system kernel. We consider the success of that investigation 
and the subsequent implementation of our ideas rewarding, since 
it is usually not easy to incorporate fault tolerance facili-
ties in an already existing system. The proper placement of 
such facilities so as to provide effective fault tolerance is 
not clear. 
Another contribution of this thesis is in the area of net-
work partitioning. We have presented a novel algorithm for the 
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update and merge of a partitioned data 
algorithm has some highly desirable 
storage system. This 
properties. It allows 
autonomous processing in all partitions of a data storage sys-
tem whilst it is partitioned. Its protocol for the merge of a 
partioned data storage system ensures that conflicting update 
operations are detected and resolved before a merge operation 
is allowed to proceed. It uses the contents of its stable 
update set to carry out operations of a minority partition for 
which no conflict is detected. In the event of the detection of 
an error, it ensures that update operations which have already 
been applied to the majority of replicas of an object are not 
undone. 
Our approach combined the stable storage concept with 
facilities for providing crash resistance in file systems and 
replication of data objects on different machines to provide a 
data storage system which is highly reliable and highly avail-
able. In conclusion, we would like to believe that we have 
explored a particular subject area and thrown some light on 
some concepts and aspects of that area through survey, design 
and implementation. On a personal level, it has provided me 
with a deeper knowledge of computing systems and their relia-
bility problems, and yielded the satisfaction of participating 
in their solution (even in a small way). 
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APPENDIX 
Implementation of the Fault Tolerance Notation 
This section shows how the fault tolerance notation of 
chapter 3 was implemented using the exception package described 
in section 3.4.2. This is done by presenting the implementation 
of the procedures of the transient layer, procedures Tread and 
Twrite, using this package and a Pascal-like language for reada-
bility. The exception handling package does not allow the use 
of break or return statements within an exception context. How-
ever, we have used break and return statements below whenever we 
found that they improved readability. Exc-signal statements are 
used to indicate exceptional return of a procedure and Return 
statements are used to indicate normal return. 
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Proc Tread(fd: inti buf: array[ ••. ] of char; 
const bufsize = 512; /*size of buffer */ 
type answer = (goodread,diskerror, .•. ); 
bufsize: int) 
var result: answer; 
retryno, maxtry:int; 
BAD-DISK,OTHERS,OP-FAIL:exception; 
begin 
end. 
BEGIN 
repeat 
/*beginning of exception context*/ 
result = read(fd,buf,bufsize); 
if result = goodread then break /*exit from loop*/ 
else 
if result = diskerror /*disk error detected*/ 
then exc-raise(BAD-DISK) 
else exc-raise(OTHERS); /*error not disk error*/ 
EXCEPTION 
WHEN(BAD-DISK) 
retryno = retryno + 1; 
WHEN(OTHERS) 
write reports, "error not disk error"; 
break; 
END /*end of context */ 
until retryno >= maxtry; 
if result = goodread then return(result) 
else exc-signal(OP-FAIL); 
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Proc Twrite(fd: inti buf: array[ .•. ] of char; bufsize- int) 
const bufsize = 512; -
type answer = (goodread,goodwrt,diskerror, •.• ); 
var resultw,resultr: answer; 
ok-wrt: boolean initially False; 
BAD-DISK,BAD-RAW,OP-FAIL,OTHERS:exception· 
begin ' 
BEGIN /*beginning of context*/ 
repeat 
resultw write(fd,bufl,bufsize); 
if resultw = goodwrt then 
end. 
/*do the read-after-write*/ 
begin 
end 
seek to beginning-of-block; 
resultr = read(fd,buf2,bufsize); 
if resultr < > goodread 
then exc-raise(BAD-DISK); 
/*can't read written values*/ 
if bufl = buf2 then 
begin ok-wrt = True; 
break; 
end 
else exc-raise(BAD-RAW); 
/*detects good write that 
writes wrong values*/ 
else if resultw = diskerror then exc-raise(BAD-DISK) 
else exc-raise(OTHERS); 
EXCEPTION 
WHEN(BAD-DISK) 
retryno = retryno + 1; 
WHEN (BAD-RAW) /*bad read-after-write*/ 
retryno = retryno + 1; 
lseek to beginning of block /*necessary since write 
operation was successful*/ 
WHEN(OTHERS) 
write reports "not disk error"; 
break; 
END /* end of context*/ 
until retryno >= maxtry; 
if ok-wrt then return(resultw) 
else exc-signal(OP-FAIL); 
One of the difficulties encountered in separating normal 
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and exceptional processing in this implementation was that the 
fault tolerance notation is not amenable to a direct implementa-
tion by the exception handling package. We also always have the 
need to return a result object both during normal and excep-
tional termination since the caller of a function in our 
environment quite often interrogates and uses this returned 
value. The concept of a procedure terminating in more than one 
way and returning result objects differing in number and type is 
not addressed by the exception handling package. One of the 
reasons for this is that the ADA language exception handling 
model on which this exception package is based does not have 
parameterised exceptions, through which exceptional result 
objects can be returned (as in the CLU language, for example). 
Another difficulty was the use of exception contexts, 
within which a designer is allowed to terminate the execution of 
a block by raising exceptions but not allowed to terminate nor-
mally by issuing a return statement. Despite these difficulties, 
we found that the separation of normal and exceptional process-
ing and the clean control structure which the exception package 
gives, greatly enhances the reliability of our implementation. 
